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Segall: Invisible Justices

INVISIBLE JUSTICES: HOW OUR HIGHEST
COURT HIDES FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
Eric J. Segall
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of the United States is one of the least
transparent governmental institutions in the United States. The
Justices’ reluctance to show themselves on camera has been debated
and criticized at length but is only one small part of a more disturbing
and consistent pattern of secrecy. The Court acts in mysterious ways
across a broad range of official duties. This Article examines how the
Court uses that secrecy to hide important aspects of its work from the
American public. In addition to forbidding cameras in their
courtroom,1 the Justices follow different and less onerous ethical and
professional rules than all other federal judges.2 The Justices do not
have to and almost never explain important recusal decisions even
when a party has filed an official motion alleging that the Justice is

I’d like to thank the students of the Georgia State University Law Review for all of their hard
work on this paper as well as on the symposium for which it was written (especially Christine Lee and
Luke Donohue) as well as the participants in that symposium for their comments on an earlier draft. I’d
also like to thank Professor Lisa McEleroy and journalist Tony Mauro for prior assistance with this
paper.
1. Clerk of Court: Supreme Court of the United States, Guide for Counsel in Cases to be Argued
Before The Supreme Court of the United States 3 (Oct. 2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/guideforcounsel.pdf (stating that lawyers are not allowed to have electronic devices,
including cameras, in the court room and that “news cameras are not allowed in the [Supreme] Court
building”); Frequently Asked Questions, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, http://www.supremecourt.gov/
faq_visiting.aspx (last visited Apr. 31, 2016) (noting that “no photography is allowed inside the
Courtroom at any time” and additionally visitors should “refrain from taking . . . cameras . . . cell
phones . . . [and] other electronic devices” into the Courtroom when the Court is in session); On
Cameras in Supreme Court, Souter Says, ‘Over My Dead Body’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/30/us/on-cameras-in-supreme-court-souter-says-over-my-deadbody.html (“Justice Souter and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy made it clear that even though Federal
appeals courts allow cameras to cover proceedings, television will not be allowed in the Supreme Court
any time soon.”).
2. Nancy Smith, What? Accountability for U.S. Supreme Court Justices . . . Finally?, SUNSHINE
STATE NEWS (Apr. 22, 2015, 6:00 PM), http://www.sunshinestatenews.com/story/what-accountabilityus-supreme-court-justices-finally (stating that Supreme Court Justices should be subject to a code of
ethics just like all federal judges and describing a bill—the Supreme Court Ethics Act—that has been
reintroduced in Congress to accomplish that goal); see infra text accompanying notes 185 and 204.
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biased or has an improper interest in the litigation.3 The Justices have
no obligation to make their official, taxpayer-funded papers public
after they leave office.4 The Justices do not even have to disclose
their individual votes on whether to hear or not hear the very few
cases they decide to accept to each year.5
The Justices, no doubt, need their independence to perform their
jobs, but the Court as an institution does not have to remain a
mythical and mysterious place shrouded in secrecy and removed
from meaningful public inspection. There is a general presumption of
transparency in our democracy that requires strong evidence of harm
before the government is allowed to act in secret.6 This presumption,
however, does not apply to our highest court to the shame of the
Justices, the institution, and ultimately, our democracy.
I. CAMERAS
Going into the last week of June 2015, the Supreme Court of the
United States was on the verge of handing down blockbuster cases on
same-sex marriage and the Affordable Care Act.7 Millions of
Americans waited anxiously for the Justices to interpret the
Constitution and federal statutory law and answer fundamental
3. See Christopher Riffle, Ducking Recusal: Justice Scalia’s Refusal to Recuse Himself from
Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Colombia, 541 U.S. 913 (2004), and the Need
for a Unique Recusal Standard for Supreme Court Justices, 84 NEB. L. REV. 650, 667 (2005)
(“Currently, a Justice’s recusal decision is completely autonomous and definitive. Even if there is some
question regarding the appropriateness of the Justice’s decision, there is no statutory provision to be
invoked that would allow such an inquisition.”).
4. Eric J. Segall, What Are the Supreme Court Justices Hiding?, L.A. TIMES (May 5, 2014, 11:09
PM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-segall-supreme-court-transparency-20140505story.html (arguing that Supreme Court Justices’ papers should be deemed public property, as are the
papers of other government officials whose “salaries are paid by taxpayers,” after “taking into account
reasonable privacy concerns”).
5. Eric J. Segall, Let’s Lift the Supreme Court’s Veil of Secrecy, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2014, 5:04
PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1008-segall-scotus-anonymous-certiorari-20141007story.html (arguing that the practice of the Supreme Court not revealing which Justices voted for or
against hearing a case—unless a Justice writes a dissent—is inconsistent with government transparency
in a democracy).
6. Id.
7. See infra notes 8, 11, and accompanying text; see also Richard Wolf, 6 Major Cases Await
Supreme Court Rulings, USA TODAY (June 25, 2015, 10:11 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
politics/2015/06/25/supreme-court-major-cases-remaining/29106717/l.
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questions about how we define ourselves as a country. No one (other
than the Justices) knew on which specific days the Court would hand
down these decisions (the Justices never inform the public in
advance), but most everyone knew that the cases were forthcoming.
Over two dramatic June days, for many, the world changed. Justice
Anthony Kennedy, a Ronald Reagan appointed Republican from
California, announced that the Supreme Court had decided by a
bitterly divided 5–4 vote that same-sex couples have a constitutional
right to marry just like heterosexual couples.8 Thousands of
Americans, gay and straight, wept for joy.9 Others, of course,
believed the decision to be both a tragic mistake and a terrible
usurpation of power by five Justices.10
The Supreme Court also announced that the attempt by a few diehard objectors to gut the Affordable Care Act would not succeed. By
a vote of 6–3, the Court rejected the challengers’ bizarre argument
that federal health exchanges could not offer federal tax subsidies.11
Millions of Americans would continue to be able to afford health
insurance. During this same time period, the Court also handed down
8. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (holding that “the right of same-sex couples
to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived . . . from that
Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws” and thus, “the Fourteenth Amendment
requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex”).
9. Sebastian Ivory, Today We Celebrate but Tomorrow We Get Back to Work, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 29, 2015, 2:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sebastian-ivory/today-we-celebrate-buttomorrow-we-get-back-to-work_b_7674880.html.
10. Call to Action Scholars Statement, CAMPAIGN FOR AMERICAN PRINCIPLES,
https://campaignforamericanprinciples.com/scholars-statement (last visited Apr. 13, 2016) (“Because we
stand with President Lincoln against judicial despotism, we also stand with these distinguished legal
scholars who are calling on officeholders to reject Obergefell as an unconstitutional effort to usurp the
authority vested by the Constitution in the people and their representatives. At the same time, we stand
with the four dissenting Supreme Court justices in Obergefell who rightly noted that the judicially
imposed redefinition of marriage is a judicial power grab that will—as Justice Alito wrote in his
dissent—’vilify Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy.’”); Judicial Watch on
Supreme Court’s Ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges, JUDICIAL WATCH (June 26, 2015),
http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/press-releases/judicial-watch-statement-on-supreme-courtsruling-in-obergefell-v-hodges (“The exercise of raw judicial power by five justices should be resisted
under law and overturned.”).
11. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2484 (2015) (holding that tax credits are available to
individuals in states that have a Federal Exchange, and stating that “[s]ection 18031(i)(3)(B)’s
requirement that all Exchanges create outreach programs to ‘distribute fair and impartial information
concerning . . . the availability of premium tax credits under section 36B’—would make little sense if
tax credits were not available on Federal Exchanges.”).
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divided opinions on redistricting, the death penalty, and other
important issues.12
No one but a few reporters and about 250 people saw the Court
announce these decisions.13 C-Span offered to televise the proceeding
so that those interested could gather around their televisions, tablets,
and smart phones to observe history, but the Justices refused that
request.14
There will never be any video or even photographic evidence of
these historic cases. When law professors teach these cases to future
generations of students, neither will be able to see how proud Justice
Kennedy was to provide equal rights to gay Americans or how
Justice Roberts turned away a politically inspired challenge to
President Obama’s signature legislation.15 Truly historic
governmental business was transacted largely in private away from
the American people.
There are compelling reasons to televise Supreme Court
proceedings, both the oral arguments and the decision days, and few
persuasive objections to keep them off the air. It is well past time the
Supreme Court enters modern times and joins most of the states as
well as the supreme courts of Canada, Brazil, and the United
Kingdom, and allow live television coverage of its official business.16
A. The Arguments For and Against Cameras
The first argument in favor of cameras in the Supreme Court is a
simple one: The oral arguments and decision days are already public
events, C-Span is willing to televise them at its own expense, and
there are obviously many Americans who want to witness the
12. Wolf, supra note 7.
13. Visiting the Court, SUPREME CT. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/htcw_
visiting.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2016) (“The public seating capacity is approximately 250; but for the
most dramatic cases and special occasions there is never enough room.”).
14. Judge Steve Leben & Judge Kevin S. Burke, Supreme Court Itself Will Be Tested as it Hears
Health-Case Arguments, MINN POST: COMMUNITY VOICES (Mar. 26, 2012), https://www.minnpost.com
/community-voices/2012/03/supreme-court-itself-will-be-tested-it-hears-health-case-arguments.
15. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
16. Kyu H. Youm, Cameras in the Courtoom in the Twenty-First Century: The U.S. Supreme Court
Learning From Abroad?, 2012 BYU L. Rev. 1989, 1990–92 (2012).
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proceedings.17 We normally have a strong presumption that open
government hearings will be, well, open. As Dean Erwin
Chemerinsky has written: “Supreme Court proceedings, of course,
are government events and there should be a strong presumption that
people should be able to watch government proceedings. Arguments
in the Supreme Court always have been open to the public, but
relatively few can attend in person.”18
In addition to the normal presumption of transparency, there are a
myriad of cultural, educational, historical, and civic benefits to
allowing cameras at the Supreme Court. The American people could
watch lawyers and judges argue over our most controversial,
divisive, and sometimes partisan issues, with mutual respect, civility,
and deference. Especially in these overly partisan times, the oral
arguments could set an example of how public officials can disagree,
sometimes bitterly, without undue rancor.
Our national museums could display the Court’s most important
cases with the Justices on video arguing over the issues and
announcing the results. Students in elementary and secondary
schools, colleges, and law schools could gain better insight and
understanding about the Court and great historical debates over race
relations, abortion, gun control, and voting rights by actually seeing
the Justices perform their duties. Perhaps most importantly, when the
Court hands down landmark decisions like last term’s same-sex
marriage opinion, millions of Americans could gather together in a
moment of national pride (or anguish) and political engagement
which would be markedly different from hearing the news second
hand from a few select journalists.
Balanced against all of those benefits are a few unpersuasive
arguments the Justices routinely trot out against cameras in the Court.
Perhaps the most famous statement made by a Justice opposing
cameras was Justice David Souter’s admonition that “the day you see
a camera come into our courtroom, it’s going to roll over my dead
17. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, Time to Televise Supreme Court Proceedings, ORANGE CO.
REG. (Mar. 19 2014), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/court-606042-arguments-supreme.html.
18. Id.
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body.”19 Souter explained that he was concerned that statements
made during oral arguments could be taken out of context by the
media and that the “judiciary is not a political institution . . . nor is it
part of the entertainment industry.”20
Justice Souter’s concern that cameras should not be allowed
because the Court is not a “political institution” is particularly
revealing. Although the political or legal nature of the Court’s
decision-making is beyond the scope of this paper, one does not have
to be a core legal realist to appreciate that the Justices make
fundamentally important decisions about many of our country’s most
controversial issues based largely on vague text, contested history,
and precedents that can be interpreted in many different ways.21
Justice Souter’s vehement opposition to cameras was probably based
on his desire to maintain the Court’s image as an apolitical font of
law rather than a values laden (and at least somewhat if not mostly
political) institution.
Other Justices have also expressed concern that the media might
distort out-of-context snippets of Court proceedings if cameras were
allowed in the Courtroom.22 For example, testifying in front of
Congress on the Court’s budget, Justice Stephen Breyer said, “If you
see on television a person taking a picture of you and really
mischaracterizing [what you say], the first time you see that, the next
day you’ll watch a lot more carefully what you say. Now that’s
what’s worrying me.”23
Dean Chemerinsky once again has provided a persuasive response:
I have heard justices express concern that if television
cameras were allowed, the media might broadcast excerpts
that offer a misleading impression of arguments and the
19. On Cameras in Supreme Court, supra note 1.
20. Id.
21. See generally ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A COURT
AND ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES (2012).
22. See Tal Kopan, At Sequestration Hearing, Breyer, Kennedy Say Cameras in the Courtroom Too
Risky, POLITICO (Mar. 14, 2013, 12:59 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/03/atsequestration-hearing-breyer-kennedy-say-cameras-in-the-courtroom-too-risky-159328.
23. Id.
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court. But that is true when any government proceeding is
taped or even when reporters cover any event. A newspaper
or television reporter could quote a justice’s question or a
lawyer’s answer out of context. The Supreme Court should
not be able to protect itself from misreporting any more
than any other government institution can do so.
The justices might be afraid that an excerpt of oral
arguments might be used for entertainment purposes;
perhaps they will even be mocked. But that is a cost of
being a democratic society and of holding a prominent
position in government. In no other context would Supreme
Court justices say that government officials can protect
themselves from possible criticism by cutting off public
access.24
Some Justices have expressed fears that their fellow Justices,
lawyers, or both may misbehave and grandstand if cameras were
allowed in the Supreme Court.25 For example, Justice Anthony
Kennedy has said that with cameras there may be an “insidious
temptation to think that one of my colleagues is trying to get a sound
bite for the television” and that would “alter the way in which we
hear our cases, the way in which we talk to each other, the way in
which we use that precious hour.”26 How the Justices behave,
however, is in their own control and not an excuse to hide their
official public duties from the American people. To the extent there
is concern over lawyers misbehaving, the Justices are more than
capable of preventing lawyers from playing to the cameras in an
inappropriate manner.27
Perhaps the strongest (yet still not persuasive) objection to cameras
in the Supreme Court is that the public may perceive or come to
24. Chemerinsky, supra note 17.
25. Kristin Linsley Myles et al., Supreme Court Watch: Cameras in the Courtroom?, 38 S.F. ATT’Y
MAG. 49, 51 (2012), https://www.sfbar.org/forms/sfam/q22012/scw-cameras-in-the-courtroom.pdf.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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believe that oral arguments play a larger and more significant role in
the Justices’ final decisions than they actually do.28 Justice Sonia
Sotomayor, one of many Justices who was more open-minded about
cameras during her confirmation hearings than after ascending to the
bench, has said that televising oral arguments “could be more
misleading than helpful . . . . It’s like reading tea leaves.”29 Justice
Antonin Scalia argued that televising oral arguments would present a
misleading view of the Court both because oral arguments account
for little of what the Court actually does and snippets of the
arguments would be taken out of context.30
None of these arguments, however, apply in the least to the
dramatic June decision days when the Justices do nothing more than
announce their decisions in nationally watched cases. There, the
Justices completely control the message they want to send and how
much or little information they provide to the public.
Moreover, it is not up to government officials to decide what
already public information should be shared with the public. If the
American people overstate the importance of oral arguments or take
“snippets” out of context, the Justices have many different ways to
correct those misapprehensions.31 Additionally, keeping the
arguments secret and hidden away might in fact give them an
importance out of proportion to their actual relevance.32 If the
arguments are not that important, what is the harm of putting them on
television for all the world to see?
The Justices make the transcripts and audio recordings of oral
arguments available for public inspection.33 But for new generations
of young Americans raised on YouTube and iPhones, live streaming
28. Sam Baker, Justice Sotomayor no Longer Backs Television Cameras in Supreme Court, THE
HILL (Feb. 7, 2013, 7:25 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/news/281765-sotomayor-no-longer-backscameras-in-supreme-court.
29. Id.
30. Stephanie Condon, Scalia: Cameras in the Court Will “Miseducate” People, CBS NEWS (July
26, 2012, 11:37 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/scalia-cameras-in-the-court-will-miseducatepeople.
31. Gabe Roth, Why Doesn’t the Supreme Court have Cameras?, MSNBC (July 25, 2015, 9:41
AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/why-doesnt-the-supreme-court-have-cameras.
32. See Condon, supra note 30.
33. Myles et.al., supra note 25.
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and television coverage of important news events is the most
important information currency.34
Numerous state courts and other countries have allowed cameras
in their courtrooms for a long time with overwhelmingly positive
results.35 For example, Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor of the Ohio
Supreme Court has written essays and op-eds supporting the use of
cameras in Ohio courtrooms and recounting the beneficial positive
effects of cameras in the courtrooms.36 Her conclusion is that “the
objective evidence is persuasive that open, transparent courtrooms—
including broadcast proceedings with reasonable restrictions—
support public understanding of the courts and foster trust and
confidence in the judicial system.”37
Over forty states now allow use of cameras, video streaming, or
both throughout their systems including in their supreme courts.38
The O.J. Simpson case notwithstanding,39 there have been few
complaints about the use of cameras with judges and lawyers saying
their presence does not adversely affect the proceedings.40 In
addition, the high courts of Canada, the United Kingdom, and Brazil
also televise their proceedings.41 All three countries report positive
experiences.42
34. See Doug Gross, Survey: More Americans Get News from Internet than Newspapers or Radio,
CNN (Mar. 1, 2010, 12:12 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/03/01/social.network.news/
index.html.
35. Cameras in the Courtroom, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS,
http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/digital-journalists-legal-guide/cameras-courtrooms
(last visited Apr. 13, 2016); S.M. Oliva, Put Cameras in the Supreme Court, REASON.COM (Apr. 13,
2014, 12:00 PM), https://reason.com/archives/2014/04/13/put-cameras-in-the-supreme-court/print; see
infra notes 38−42 and accompanying text.
36. E.g., Maureen O’Connor, Cameras Do Belong in the Courtroom, WASH. POST (July 18, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/cameras-do-belong-in-the-courtroom/2013/07/18/e4bc45bcee2f-11e2-bb32-725c8351a69e_story.html.
37. Id.
38. Utah Joins States with Courts Open to Cameras, RADIO TELEVISION DIG. NEWS ASSOC. (Mar.
28, 2013, 1:30 PM), http://www.rtdna.org/article/utah_joins_states_with_courts_open_to_cameras.
39. See Times Editorial Board, Another Casualty of the O.J. Trial: Cameras in Courtrooms, L.A.
TIMES (June 11, 2014, 8:08 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-oj-20140611story.html.
40. Ronald D. Rotunda, Cameras in the Supreme Court, VERDICT (Nov. 9, 2015),
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/11/09/cameras-in-the-supreme-court.
41. Youm, supra note 16, at 1990.
42. See id. at 2005–31.
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While all of this progress is being made elsewhere, the Supreme
Court of the United States is resisting this trend of openness and
transparency. In his 2014 Year End Report, which was “embargoed”
as usual until 6:00 p.m. on New Year’s Eve, Chief Justice John
Roberts tried to make the case that the Court has historically and
appropriately been slow to embrace new technology. Chief Justice
Roberts explained his views in the Year End Report:
Under our constitutional scheme, the courts are neutral
arbiters of concrete disputes that rely on parties with
genuine grievances to initiate the process and frame the
issues for decision. The courts’ passive and circumscribed
role directly affects how courts deploy information
technology. The courts understandably focus on those
innovations that, first and foremost, advance their primary
goal of fairly and efficiently adjudicating cases through the
application of law.43
The controversial premise of this rather opaque argument, that the
Justices are “neutral arbiters” who play a “passive and
circumscribed” role in our “constitutional scheme,” sounds a lot like
the famous “umpire” analogy Chief Justice Roberts set out during his
confirmation hearing.44 But, as the author of Shelby County v.
Holder45 and of the concurrence in Citizens United v. FEC,46 two
controversial and powerful exercises of the judicial power, Chief
Justice Roberts should know better. Polls show the Court losing favor
with the American people, who are becoming increasingly skeptical
that politics are not significantly involved in the Court’s decisions.47
43. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., YEAR END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4 (2014),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2014year-endreport.pdf.
44. Id.; Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G.
Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States).
45. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2617 (2013).
46. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010).
47. Nick Gass, Poll: Disapproval of Supreme Court Reaches New High, POLITICO (Oct. 2, 2015,
8:50 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/poll-supreme-court-approval-rating-214363.
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There may have been a time when the Justices remaining mysterious
and out of the public eye helped perpetuate the “neutral arbiter” myth
but with the advent of the internet, iPhones, and computer tablets of
every variety the people can now see their leaders in many different
ways on a variety of different mediums.48 The secrecy that Chief
Justice Roberts believes breeds confidence now likely produces
suspicion.
No one is asking the Court to thoughtlessly embrace brand new
technology that may implicate security, administrative, or privacy
concerns. The call is for the Justices to allow C-Span to cover already
public hearings where the Court performs its basic functions: hearing
oral arguments and announcing its decisions.49 Vague and
unsubstantiated fears of lawyer or Justice showboating or possible
public misperception of the nature of these already open proceedings
should not deprive the American people of access to their
government.50 The Court should allow cameras into all of its
proceedings where members of the public are invited. Anything less
than allowing that full coverage suggests that the Justices are hiding
from the very people they are supposed to work for and who pay
their salaries. That is no way to run our country’s highest Court.
II. RECUSAL
On January 10, 2014, the Supreme Court announced that Justice
Samuel Alito was recused from an important case involving the
streaming of free television programs.51 This information came in the
form of a simple statement alongside the granting of the writ of
certiorari that stated: “Justice Alito took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.”52

48. ROBERTS supra note 43.
49. See Chemerinsky, supra note 17.
50. Rotunda, supra note 40.
51. WNET Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3403
(U.S. Jan. 10, 2014) (No. 13-461).
52. Id.

Published by Reading Room, 2016

11

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 1

798

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:4

No reasons were given, but the implications for the large television
networks that brought the suit were significant because, with Alito
recused, a four-to-four tie vote would have meant the lower court
decision would be affirmed and the networks would lose the case.53
Although officially there was no way to know why Alito recused
himself, the best guess was that he owned stocks in one or more of
the companies involved in the case.54 The mere fact that we have to
guess at such an important decision demonstrates the lack of
transparency in the Court’s recusal process.
On April 16, 2014, the Supreme Court announced in a routine
entry on its docket that “Justice Alito is no longer recused in this
case.”55 Again, Justice Alito provided no reason for this decision.56
The speculation was that he had sold the stock that he likely held in
one or more of the companies.57 This change had significant
implications for the case because now a four-to-four tie vote was no
longer possible.
We never learned why Justice Alito first recused himself in the
case and suddenly, on the eve of oral argument, did not, but he
should have explained his mysterious change of heart. If he had a
sincere, neutral desire to make sure a full Court could hear the case
that would seem to be a legitimate reason, but what if the change was
prompted by his desire to make sure one of the parties in the case
would win? That motivation seems far less appropriate. Moreover, a
federal judge who decides to sell stock in a company so that he can
sit on a case may defer the capital gains if he reinvests in certain
government-approved instruments.58 There is nothing wrong with
this incentive to sit on a case, but it arguably makes it even more
53. WNET Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom, ABC, Inc. v. Aereo,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
54. Lyle Denniston, Alito Rejoins the Court in Two Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 16, 2014, 5:15 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/alito-rejoins-the-court-in-two-cases.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see also Jonathan Handel, Justice Alito Rejoins Aereo Supreme Court Case, HOLLYWOOD
REP. (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/justice-alito-rejoins-aereo-supreme696950.
58. Marianna Bettman, Judicial “Unrecusal”, LEGALLY SPEAKING OH. (Jan. 6, 2012),
http://www.legallyspeakingohio.com/2012/01/judicial-%E2%80%9Cunrecusal%E2%80%9D.
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important to know why the Justices sometimes recuse, why they do
not, and most importantly, why they sometimes change their minds
right before the case is argued.
The law of recusal is essential for the rule of law to function
effectively.59 Judges deciding cases and controversies must be
impartial and unbiased.60 This age-old idea of judicial fairness can be
traced back to Roman times.61 Without fair judges, there can be no
justice.62
In this country, since 1792, Congress has required federal judges
to recuse themselves from hearing any case in which they have a
financial interest or have served as counsel for either party.63 This old
recusal statute has been amended many times since then in an effort
to ensure greater judicial impartiality, but is still in place today,
supported by all of the policy considerations that engendered it in the
first place.64 If the public does not have a strong belief that judges
decide cases without bias or personal stake, the public will not have
confidence in the transparency and fairness of their decisions.65
Federal laws require all federal judges, including Supreme Court
Justices, to recuse themselves from deciding cases in a large number
of situations.66 Although the statute governing recusal is complex, the
central purpose of the requirements is that the judges should not hear
cases when they (or immediate family members) have a financial or
other personal interest in the case, when they have previously
expressed their views on the outcome of the case, or when they
59. Gabriel D. Serbulea, Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The Need for Reform, 38 PEPP.
L. REV. 1109, 1140 (2011).
60. Id. at 1118, 1118 n.70.
61. Id. at 1112 (stating a Roman judge could be disqualified before trial on grounds of suspicion).
The Torah states that bribes or other personal considerations could cloud a judge’s judgment and
therefore cause a judge to recuse himself. Rabbi Yissocher Frand, Small Favors, TORAH.ORG,
http://www.torah.org/learning/ravfrand/5772/devarim.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2016).
62. Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53
U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 532 (2005).
63. Id. at 539.
64. See Louis J. Virelli III, Congress, the Constitution, and Supreme Court Recusal, 69 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1535, 1545 (2012).
65. See Frost, supra note 62, at 532.
66. Bias or Prejudice of a Judge, 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2012); Disqualification of a Justice, Judge, or
Magistrate Judge, 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012). Section 144 applies only to district court judges while section
455 applies to all federal judges, including the Supreme Court. Id.
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served as a lawyer on the case in an official capacity.67 All of these
requirements are a subset of the first section of the recusal statute that
is a catch-all provision requiring recusal where a judge’s
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”68 The statute
measures impartiality through an objective standard that requires
recusal if a hypothetical reasonable person would find that the
judge’s impartiality could be questioned.69
Unfortunately, unlike recusal for lower court judges,70 the law
applicable to the Supreme Court contains no enforcement
mechanisms.71 In other words, whether a Supreme Court Justice
should recuse herself from a case is within the discretion of that
particular Justice with no required review of that decision at any
level.72 This exclusive authority has led to controversial and nontransparent decisions by Supreme Court Justices who refused to
recuse themselves when the circumstances strongly suggested
different outcomes.73
Supreme Court scholars have observed that there are major flaws
with how the Court decides recusal questions.74 For example, the
Justices have rarely written public memoranda explaining a decision
to recuse or not recuse in a particular case.75 This silence is a serious
threat to the rule of law, the transparency of judicial decision-making,
and the public’s confidence in the Court. A glaring example of this
lack of transparency and threat to the rule of law occurred when
Justice Elena Kagan failed to communicate about her decision not to

67. See Virelli, supra note 64, at 1545 n.19.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
69. Marcia G. Robeson, Annotation, Construction and Application of 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a)
Providing for Disqualification of Justice, Judge, Magistrate, or Referee in Bankruptcy in Any
Proceeding in Which His Partiality Might Reasonably Be Questioned, 40 A.L.R. FED. 954 (1978).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 144.
71. See Virelli, supra note 64, at 1550, 1565–66.
72. See id.
73. Louis J. Virelli III, The (Un)constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards, 2011 WIS. L.
REV. 1181, 1189–90 (2011).
74. Frost, supra note 62, at 533.
75. Virelli, supra note 73, at 1202–05. The author could only find three such examples in American
history: one by Justice Rehnquist, one by Justice Scalia (both discussed later in the chapter) , and one by
Justice Jackson criticizing a decision by Justice Black not to recuse himself in a particular case. Id.
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recuse herself in the initial litigation over President Obama’s
Affordable Care Act (ACA).76
A. Justice Kagan and the ACA
During her first term on the Supreme Court, Justice Elena Kagan
recused herself from almost one-third of the cases on the Court’s
docket,77 and she eventually recused herself from nationally
important and controversial immigration78 and affirmative action
cases.79 Although she never explained why (and, under the rules, she
did not have to explain—a transparency issue in and of itself),
presumably Justice Kagan recused herself from these cases because
federal law requires a Justice to recuse if she had been a lawyer on
the case before she sat on the Court.80 Justice Kagan had likely
worked on these cases while heading the United States Solicitor
General’s Office.81
On March 21, 2010, the United States House of Representatives
passed the ACA, otherwise known as “Obamacare.”82 The Senate
passed the bill a few months earlier, making the final passage a major
political victory for President Obama halfway through his first
term.83

76. Id. at 1183.
77. Lisa T. McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, Coming Off the Bench: Legal and Policy Implications of
Proposals to Allow Retired Justices to Sit by Designation on the Supreme Court, 61 DUKE L.J. 81, 82
(2011).
78. Stephen Dinan, High Court to Consider Ariz. Migrant Law, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2011),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/12/supreme-court-will-hear-arizona-immigration-lawca/?page=all.
79. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Agrees to Reconsider Use of Race in College Admission
Decisions, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-courtagrees-to-reconsider-use-of-race-in-college-admission-decisions/2012/02/21/gIQA2viJRR_story.html.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1)–(4) (2012).
81. Susan Navarro Smelcer & Kenneth R. Thomas, From Solicitor General to Supreme Court
Nominee: Responsibilities, History, and the Nomination of Elena Kagan, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 1, 15
(June 23, 2010), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41299.pdf.
82. H.R. 3590 (111th): Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-2010/h165# (last visited Jan. 27, 2016).
83. Id.; Terence P. Jeffrey, Kagan to Tribe on Day Obamacare Passed, CNS NEWS (Nov. 10, 2011,
1:49 PM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/kagan-tribe-day-obamacare-passed-i-hear-they-have-voteslarry-simply-amazing.
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At the time, Elena Kagan was the Solicitor General of the United
States responsible for representing the United States Government in
the Supreme Court.84 Upon hearing the news that the ACA had
passed, then-General Kagan wrote to Professor Laurence Tribe of
Harvard Law School, at the time also a member of the Obama
Administration, “I hear they have the votes, Larry!! Simply
amazing.”85 The email’s subject line was “fingers and toes crossed
today!”86 Her hope that the law would pass was obvious from these
exchanges with one of the leading constitutional law scholars in the
United States.87
Then-General Kagan’s deputy, Neal Katyal, had previously asked
her whether the Solicitor General’s Office should be involved in the
litigation strategy in the lower courts should the law be passed and
then challenged in court.88 General Kagan told her deputy that the
Office should be involved from the very beginning, and later Katyal
informed her of a meeting at the Department of Justice to discuss that
strategy.89 There is no evidence that Kagan had any direct
involvement in the case after that decision was made, but she clearly
communicated to her deputy the importance of the case. Eventually,
Katyal argued a few of the lower court cases challenging the ACA,
and he has since said that he did so without input from Kagan
(though he worked directly for her at the time).90
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.; Eric Segall, A Liberal’s Lament on Kagan and Health Care, SLATE (Dec. 8, 2011, 4:07 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/12/obamacare_and_the_supreme_c
ourt_should_elena_kagan_recuse_herself_.html.
87. Jeffrey, supra note 83. Professor Laurence Tribe is considered the leading liberal constitutional
law scholar of his time. Ben Jacobs, Harvard Scholar: Ted Cruz’s Citizenship, Eligibility for President
‘Unsettled’,
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
10,
2016,
8:48
PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/jan/11/laurence-tribe-ted-cruz-donald-trump-citizen-president.
88. See Josh Blackman, The Question No One Asked at Justice Kagan’s Confirmation Hearing: Why
Did She Wall Herself Off from the Obamacare Litigation, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2013, 9:01 PM),
http://volokh.com/2013/09/08/question-one-asked-justice-kagans-confirmation-hearing-wallobamacare-litigation.
89. Jonathan Turley, Should Kagan Recuse Herself from the Health Care Case?, JONATHAN TURLEY
(Nov. 15 2011), http://jonathanturley.org/2011/11/15/should-kagan-recuse-herself-from-the-health-carecase.
90. Terence P. Jeffrey, Kagan Assigned DOJ Lawyer Who Argued Obamacare Cases in Appeals
Courts, CNS NEWS (June 3, 2011, 1:04 PM), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/kagan-assigneddoj-lawyer-who-argued-obamacare-cases-appeals-courts.
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On August 5, 2010, less than six months after the passage of the
law, Elena Kagan was confirmed by the Senate as an associate justice
of the United States Supreme Court.91 When the Court eventually
decided to hear the legal challenges to Obamacare, there were
numerous calls in the press—mostly by conservatives,92 but also by a
few liberals,93 for Justice Kagan to recuse herself from the case
because the Solicitor General’s office worked on the litigation in the
lower courts. Conservative group Freedom Watch filed a formal
motion for oral argument on the issue of whether Justice Kagan
should participate in the case at the Supreme Court stage.94
The argument for Justice Kagan’s recusal in the Obamacare case
was based on numerous points.95 Although perhaps none of these
aspects of her involvement with the ACA prior to the case alone
required recusal, their cumulative effect demonstrated that Justice
Kagan should have seriously considered recusing herself:
1) Elena Kagan was the Solicitor General of the United States
working for President Obama at the highest levels of the
Administration at the time the ACA was furiously debated in
Congress and town halls across the country;96
2) The ACA was the most controversial and partisan piece of
legislation that the Obama Administration put forward;97

91. Paul Kane & Robert Barnes, Senate Confirms Elena Kagan’s Nomination to Supreme Court,
WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/05/
AR2010080505247.html.
92. Robert Barnes, Roberts Defends Supreme Court Colleagues on Recusal Issue, WASH. POST
(Dec. 31, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/roberts-defends-supreme-court-colleagueson-recusal-issue/2011/12/29/gIQAp9fySP_story.html; Mark Maynes, Legislating a Supreme Court
Recusal Process, WESTREFERENCEATTORNEYS.COM (Mar. 22, 2011), http://blog.legalsolutions.
thomsonreuters.com/legal-research/legislating-a-supreme-court-recusal-process; Michael B. Mukasey,
The ObamaCare Recusal Nonsense, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100
01424052970204012004577070162911944188.html; Editorial, The Supreme Court’s Recusal Problem,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/01/opinion/the-supreme-courts-recusalproblem.html?_r=0.
93. Segall, supra note 86.
94. Bill Mears, High Court Turns Aside Recusal Request on Health Care Challenge, CNN.COM (Jan.
23, 2012, 5:57 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/23/politics/scotus-health-care-recusal/.
95. See Eric J. Segall, Judicial Recusal at the Court, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 331, 338
(2012)
96. Id.
97. Id.
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3) President Obama nominated Elena Kagan to the Supreme Court
shortly after Congress enacted the ACA;98
4) The Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of the ACA
in the middle of President Obama’s reelection campaign;99
5) The President’s reelection might well have been significantly
affected by how the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of
the ACA;100
6) Elena Kagan celebrated the passage of the ACA over email with
Professor Tribe and indicated that she was pleased that it passed and
had been rooting for it to be passed;101 and
7) Both Kagan’s Office and her top deputy, Neal Katyal, were
directly involved in the Obama Administration’s litigation of the case
in the lower federal courts urging that the ACA be upheld.102
In light of these undisputed facts, Justice Kagan’s decision not to
even address the recusal issue was inappropriate. The public had no
way of knowing why Justice Kagan thought it was appropriate to
hear the case because she offered no formal explanation and did not
have to. Her recusal in many other cases (without comment) did not
help the problem.103 Why did she pick one case, and to the best of our
knowledge, only one case, to not work on while she was the Solicitor
General? Was it so she could hear the challenge to the ACA as a
Supreme Court Justice? If so, shouldn’t she then have recused
herself?
Given Justice Kagan’s silence, two substantial issues arose. First,
many thought that Justice Kagan’s “impartiality” vis à vis the ACA
could reasonably be questioned given the importance of the issue to
the President and the fact that she was nominated during the
controversy.104 Would President Obama have nominated someone to
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Segall, supra note 95.
102. Id.
103. The World’s 100 Most Powerful Women: Elena Kagan, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/
profile/elena-kagan (last visited Apr. 13, 2016).
104. Segall, supra note 95, at 338; James Sample, Supreme Court Recusal from Marbury to the
Modern Day, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 145–46 (2013).
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the Court unless he was reasonably sure she would vote to retain his
most important legislative achievement during his campaign for
reelection? The conversation—indeed, the skepticism—among legal
pundits and talking heads was high.105
Second, many believed that Justice Kagan was a “lawyer” on the
ACA litigation in light of the fact that her office unquestionably
worked on the case in the lower courts.106 Interested parties made
both of these arguments in a formal motion presented to the Court
during the ACA litigation.107 But, sadly, no hearing was held on the
issue.108
Even for those citizens who strongly supported the ACA, like this
author, Justice Kagan’s possible impartiality posed a difficult and
important question.109 For example, if as many predicted the law was
to be upheld five to four, was there any reasonable scenario in which
Justice Kagan could have written the majority opinion? After all, her
office and the lawyers who worked directly for her had litigated the
case in the lower courts.110 Even non-lawyers understood and
pondered the conflict.111 The fact that such a result was hard to
imagine should have demonstrated that Justice Kagan’s
105. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Calls for Recusal Intensify in Health Care Case, USA TODAY (Nov. 20,
2011, 8:56 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2011-11-20/supreme-courtobamacare-health/51324806/1; Stephen Dinan, Health Case Raises Recusal Questions for Kagan,
Thomas, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/14/courtannouncement-raises-recusal-questions-kagan-/?page=all; Ronald Rotunda, Evidence Mounts against
Justice Kagan for Recusal in ObamaCare Suit, FOX NEWS (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/
opinion/2012/01/26/evidence-mounts-against-justice-kagan-for-recusal-in-obamacare-suit.
106. See Segall, supra note 95.
107. Brief of Amicus Curiae Freedom Watch in Support of Neither Party and on Issue of Recusal or
Disqualification of Justice Elena Kagan, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (U.S.
2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-398 and 11-400).
108. See Mears, supra note 94.
109. See Editorial, Health Care and the Court, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2011),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/health-care-and-the-court/2011/12/02/gIQA1FbjTO_story.
html.
110. See Mears, supra note 94.
111. See generally Ben Johnson, Kagan’s Participation in ObamaCare Decision may have Violated
Judicial Ethics and Federal Statute, LIFE SITE NEWS (June 29, 2012), http://www.lifesitenews.com/
news/kagans-participation-in-obamacare-taints-the-decision; Tom Thurlow, Elena Kagan: The
ObamaCare Recusal that Wasn’t, AMERICAN THINKER (June 21, 2012), http://www.american
thinker.com/2012/06/elena_kagan_the_obamacare_recusal_that_wasnt.html. But see Jess Bravin,
Research Casts Doubt on Roberts as Author of ACA Dissent, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (July 3, 2013),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/07/03/research-points-away-from-roberts-as-author-of-aca-dissent.
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“impartiality” was at a minimum in doubt. Moreover, because it is
indisputable that her chief deputy Katyal would have had to recuse
himself from the case had he been the newly minted Justice on the
Court (because he was the lawyer of record on the case below), it
makes little sense that his boss—to whom he answered—was
impartial enough to sit on the case.
Finally, it appears that the only litigation Justice Kagan
deliberately refrained from working on during her term as the
Solicitor General of the United States was the ACA case.112 Why that
case and not the important affirmative action case or the controversial
immigration law case or the other hundreds of cases from which she
recused herself? This disturbing question (never answered by Justice
Kagan) raised substantial issues about her decision to hear the ACA
case and her impartiality with respect to it.
The point is not that Elena Kagan should have recused herself
from the ACA case. Rather, the lesson is that she should have
handled her decision not to recuse differently. In fact, she did nothing
and said nothing. When a non-party moved for oral argument on the
recusal question, the motion became an official part of the record in
the case.113 Still, the Court denied the motion 8-0 with no explanation
(although at least Justice Kagan did not participate in that
decision).114
The issues surrounding Justice Kagan and Obamacare vividly
demonstrate the transparency problems with the Court’s recusal
procedures. Professor Amanda Frost detailed these problems in an
article in which she pointed out the many ways recusal procedures
differ from the normal methods of adjudication:
Unlike almost any other area of the law, the process by
which judges decide whether to recuse themselves ignores
the systems usually employed to resolve disputes in a fair
and impartial manner. As a general matter, the recusal
112. See Editorial, supra note 109.
113. Orders in Pending Cases (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/012
312zor.pdf.
114. Id.
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process is usually not adversarial, does not provide for a
full airing of the relevant facts, is not bounded by a
developed body of law, and often is not concluded by the
issuance of a reasoned explanation for the judge’s decision.
Most importantly, the decision itself is almost always made
in the first instance by the very judge being asked to
disqualify himself, even though that judge has an obvious
personal stake in the matter. [T]his very ad hoc and
informal process, rather than any problem with the
substantive standards for recusal . . . has led to the recurring
dissatisfaction with the law.115
All of these problems arose with Justice Kagan’s refusal to even
address the recusal issues in the Obamacare case. There was never an
adversarial hearing on the appropriateness of her failure to recuse, the
public never learned the truth or falsity of many of the relevant facts,
the law as to the meaning of the word “lawyer” in the recusal statute
remained undefined for further purposes, and we never heard from
Justice Kagan on the topic (other than a few general remarks at her
confirmation hearing before the controversy arose). Although the
motion to recuse in this case came from a non-party, there are no
requirements that the Justices act differently when such a motion
comes through a party to the case. This lack of transparency is a
serious flaw in the process that Professor Frost, among others, argues
needs to be remedied with federal legislation.116
The Obamacare case was one of the most important Supreme
Court decisions of this century, keeping the public’s attention for
years. It could have (or maybe did play) a major role in a national
election. The issue of whether Justice Kagan should participate in the
case was discussed in major newspapers, online journals, and was the
subject of a formal motion—likely a meritorious one—before the

115. Frost, supra note 62, at 536 (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 552, 558; Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Courts, 87 IOWA L.
REV. 1213, 1251 (2002); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589,
643 (1987); Virelli, supra note 73, at 1190–91.
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Court.117 If Justice Kagan had been a lower court judge, at least other
judges would have reviewed her decision not to recuse as a matter of
appeal. Yet, Justice Kagan was silent, her decision was unreviewable,
and once again the Supreme Court of the United States acted in
almost total secrecy.
B. Justice Rehnquist and the Failure to Recuse
The troubling case of Elena Kagan and the ACA is not an isolated
instance of a Supreme Court Justice facing a difficult recusal issue.
Another disturbing example is Laird v. Tatum,118 and Justice William
Rehnquist’s failure to recuse.119
Prior to becoming a Supreme Court Justice, Rehnquist was the
head of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) inside the Department of
Justice.120 This Office provides legal advice to the president on
difficult legal questions.121
While Justice Rehnquist was the head of the OLC, there arose a
dispute over the legality of a widespread domestic surveillance
program implemented by the military.122 The Army allegedly spied
on American citizens critical of the Vietnam War.123 As part of the
Nixon Administration, Rehnquist spoke out publicly (and in front of
Congress) on the constitutional validity of the program and even
testified that the lawsuit challenging the program should be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.124
By the time the case reached the United States Supreme Court, and
after the court of appeals had found that it had jurisdiction over the
case, Rehnquist was an associate justice.125 He not only had a
“personal and professional stake in the legality and continued
117. Lyle Denniston, A Note on Kagan and Health Care, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 23, 2012, 10:40 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/a-note-on-kagan-and-health-care/; Mears, supra note 94.
118. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972).
119. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William’s Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the Duty to Sit,
57 BUFF. L. REV. 813, 851–63 (2009).
120. Id. at 852.
121. Id. at 852–53 n.113.
122. Id. at 852.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 852–53.
125. Stempel, supra note 119, at 854.
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operation of the program, [and had] formed views on this particular
program’s constitutionality prior to ascending to the bench,” but he
also “appeared to have partiality toward the government’s view of
both the procedural and substantive merits of any challenge to the
surveillance program.”126 Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist decided to
sit on the case. The plaintiffs’ claims were eventually dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction by a 5–4 vote.127 Had Justice Rehnquist recused
himself, the case would have gone forward because a tie vote in the
Supreme Court would have affirmed the lower court decision finding
jurisdiction proper.
In a rare public statement by a Supreme Court Justice, Rehnquist
tried to justify his decision to review the case despite his obvious
prejudgment of its merits.128 As he explained (in a concept that would
later be adopted by Justices Roberts and Scalia), Supreme Court
Justices have a “duty to sit” unless the case for recusal is crystal
clear.129 Here, Justice Rehnquist said, it was not:
Those federal courts of appeals which have considered the
matter have unanimously concluded that a federal judge has
a duty to sit where not disqualified which is equally as
strong as the duty to not sit where disqualified. These cases
dealt with disqualification on the part of judges of the
district courts and of the courts of appeals. I think that the
policy in favor of the ‘equal duty’ concept is even stronger
in the case of a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States. There is no way of substituting Justices on this
Court as one judge may be substituted for another in the
district courts. There is no higher court of appeal which
may review an equally divided decision of this Court and
thereby establish the law for our jurisdiction. While it can
seldom be predicted with confidence at the time that a
Justice addresses himself to the issue of disqualification
126.
127.
128.
129.
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whether or not the Court in a particular case will be closely
divided, the disqualification of one Justice of this Court
raises the possibility of an affirmance of the judgment
below by an equally divided Court. The consequence
attending such a result is, of course, that the principle of
law presented by the case is left unsettled. The
undesirability of such a disposition is obviously not a
reason for refusing to disqualify oneself where in fact one
deems himself disqualified, but I believe it is a reason for
not ‘bending over backwards’ in order to deem one’s self
disqualified.130
History has not been kind to Justice Rehnquist’s decision to sit on
Laird v. Tatum.131 When he was nominated to be Chief Justice in
1986, the issue of his failure to recuse in Laird arose again, with
national experts on judicial ethics testifying in Congress that Justice
Rehnquist acted as “a ‘judge in his own case,’” and arguing that there
was at least “a reasonable question as to his impartiality.”132
If Rehnquist is correct that Supreme Court Justices have a higher
obligation to sit on cases than lower court judges, then perhaps he (as
well as Justice Kagan in the ACA case) acted reasonably. If,
however, doubts should be resolved in favor of recusal, perhaps to
maintain the public’s faith in the justice system or to insure fair and
impartial justice, then it is hard to imagine that Rehnquist should
have resolved a case involving a spying program he publicly
defended while a member of the Administration that created the
program after he publicly said the case should be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction (a result he voted for when he became a Justice).
C. Recusal and the Constitution
The issue of judicial recusal can in some cases be so important that
it even rises to the constitutional level. The Fifth Amendment
130. Id. (internal citations omitted).
131. Stempel, supra note 119, at 861.
132. Id. at 862.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss4/1

24

Segall: Invisible Justices

2016]

INVISIBLE JUSTICES

811

guarantees every litigant in state and federal court the “due process of
law.”133 If a judge or justice sitting on a case is actually biased, or
even if there is a probability of actual bias, this constitutional
protection may be triggered.134
The Supreme Court identified this aspect of recusal in an important
and interesting case involving the West Virginia Supreme Court.135
In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,136 Caperton and his coal
companies (Caperton) alleged that the defendant, A.T. Massey Coal
Co. (Massey), fraudulently canceled a contract “after conducting
cost-benefit analyses,” concluding that “it was in [Massey’s]
financial interest to” completely destroy Caperton’s business.137 In
2002, a West Virginia jury returned a verdict for Caperton for fifty
million dollars, finding that Massey intentionally tried to destroy
Caperton’s business in “utter disregard” of Caperton’s rights.138
Aware that the West Virginia Supreme Court would consider the
appeal and knowing that judicial elections were coming in 2004, Don
Blankenship—Massey’s chairman, chief executive officer, and
president—decided to strongly support attorney Brent Benjamin in
his campaign to defeat incumbent Justice Warren McGraw, who was
up for reelection to the West Virginia Supreme Court.139
After the fifty million dollar jury verdict, but before Massey
appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court, Blankenship spent
enormous sums of money and devoted great energy trying to ensure
that Benjamin would defeat the incumbent McGraw.140 In addition to
directly contributing the $1,000 maximum to Benjamin’s campaign
committee, Blankenship gave almost $2.5 million to “And for the
Sake of the Kids,” a political organization supporting Benjamin.141
Blankenship also spent over $500,000 on direct mailings, letters, and
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883 (2009).
Id. at 872–73.
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 2008).
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872.
Id. at 872.
Id. at 873.
Id.
Id.
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television and print advertisements, to support Benjamin in his quest
to become a justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court.142
Blankenship’s three million dollars in contributions exceeded the
total amount spent by the rest of Benjamin’s supporters and three
times the total spent by Benjamin’s own campaign committee.143
With this massive financial help from Massey, Benjamin defeated
McGraw and won the seat on the West Virginia Supreme Court.144 In
October 2005, Caperton filed a motion to disqualify the newly
elected Justice Benjamin from the case under both the due process
clause of the United States Constitution and the West Virginia Code
of Judicial Conduct because of the conflict of interest caused by
Blankenship’s substantial campaign support of Justice Benjamin.145
Benjamin denied the recusal motion in April 2006, on the basis that
he found “no objective information . . . to show that this Justice has a
bias for or against any litigant, that this Justice has prejudged the
matters which comprise this litigation, or that this Justice will be
anything but fair and impartial.”146
Eventually, the West Virginia Supreme Court reversed the fifty
million dollar jury verdict Caperton won against Blankenship and his
company by a vote of 3–2, with Justice Benjamin (not surprisingly)
joining the majority opinion.147 Caperton sought a rehearing and
again moved for disqualification of Benjamin, as well as another
Justice, Elliot “Spike” Maynard.148 Photos were discovered of Justice
Maynard “vacationing with Blankenship in the French Riviera while
the case was pending.”149

142. Id.
143. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873 (“Caperton contends that Blankenship spent $1 million more than the
total amount spent by the campaign committees of both candidates combined.”).
144. Id. (“[Benjamin] received 382,036 votes (53.3%), and McGraw received 334,301 votes
(46.7%).”).
145. Id. at 873–74.
146. Id. at 874.
147. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 2008).
148. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 874–75; see Keith R. Fisher, Selva Oscura: Judicial Campaign
Contributions, Disqualification, and Due Process, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 767, 788 (2010).
149. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 874.
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Justice Maynard granted Caperton’s recusal motion.150 Meanwhile,
another Justice, Larry Starcher, also recused himself from any further
involvement in the case based on his public criticism of
Blankenship’s direct and substantial role in the 2004 judicial
elections.151 In his memorandum on recusal, Starcher urged Justice
Benjamin to recuse himself because “Blankenship’s bestowal of his
personal wealth, political tactics, and ‘friendship’ created a cancer in
the affairs of this Court.”152 Justice Benjamin, however, declined that
suggestion from his colleague and again denied Caperton’s motion
that Benjamin recuse himself from the motion to rehear the case.153
Benjamin did not explain himself.154
The West Virginia Supreme Court then granted a rehearing on
some of the legal issues decided in prior proceedings, with Justice
Benjamin now acting as the Chief Justice.155 He personally selected
two other judges to replace the recused Justices, and Caperton moved
to disqualify Justice Benjamin for the third time. Benjamin again
refused, despite the fact that polls showed that over 67% of West
Virginians doubted that Benjamin would be either fair or impartial.156
A divided court (one might say a circus) again reversed the jury
verdict by another 3–2 vote with Benjamin again in the majority. The
dissenting Justices said that “the majority opinion” was “unsupported
by the facts and existing case law,” and was “fundamentally
unfair.”157 The dissent also noted that there were serious “due process
implications” due to Benjamin’s failure to disqualify himself from
the case.158
Four months later, Justice Benjamin filed yet another opinion,
again defending the merits of the reversal of the jury verdict and his
150. Id.
151. Id. at 874–75.
152. Id. at 875.
153. Id.
154. See Fisher, supra note 148, at 788.
155. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 875.
156. Id. Benjamin countered that a “‘push poll’ was ‘neither credible nor sufficiently reliable to serve
as the basis for an elected judge’s disqualification.’” Id. (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
679 S.E.2d 223, 292 n.11 (W. Va. 2008)).
157. Id.
158. Id.
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own decision not to recuse. He said again that he had no “direct,
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest”159 in the matter and
concluded that the motion to recuse “seems little more than an
invitation to subject West Virginia’s justice system to the vagaries of
the day—a framework in which predictability and stability yield to
supposition, innuendo, half-truths, and partisan manipulations.”160 He
did not acknowledge that these very types of suppositions and
innuendo were behind the recusal rules in the first place—rules put in
place to ensure that judges were fair and that the public perceived
them to be so.
Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States decided to hear the
case.161 The same Court that has Justices who virtually never explain
their own decisions to recuse or not to recuse overturned both
Benjamin’s decision not to recuse himself and the reversal of the jury
verdict. In its opinion, the Court said that although most recusal
issues do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and are
controlled by state law and local judicial codes, when there is “the
probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker”
the due process clause does come into play.162 The Court held that, as
a matter of constitutional law, Justice Benjamin should have recused
himself from the case. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, said
the following:
We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual bias—
based on objective and reasonable perceptions—when a
person with a personal stake in a particular case had a
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the
judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s
election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.
The inquiry centers on the contribution’s relative size in
comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the
campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 876 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822 (1986)).
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 876.
Id.
Id. at 877 (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
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apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the
election.163
Although the Caperton case raises unusual issues of campaign
support for state supreme court judges, the majority’s holding that, at
a certain level, the probability of actual bias rises to a constitutional
violation shows why recusal motions against the Justices of the
United States Supreme Court raise such important concerns. Litigants
with strong recusal motions (such as the plaintiffs in the Laird case)
may bring with them the constitutional concern for fair hearings
consistent with due process. Those motions should be addressed the
same way the Supreme Court treated the motion in Caperton, with a
full adversarial process and a publicly available written explanation.
Yet, when a recusal motion is directed to a Supreme Court Justice,
there is virtually never a public hearing or written opinion. Perhaps
one of the reasons for this lack of process is the controversial “duty
to sit” relied upon by Justice Rehnquist in the Laird case (though at
least in that instance he wrote a public explanation).
D. The “Duty to Sit”
Every year the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court
issues a year-end report summarizing the state of the federal
judiciary.164 In December 2011, amidst a media frenzy discussing
whether Justices Kagan and Thomas should both recuse themselves
from the ACA litigation,165 Justice Roberts used the report to address
these concerns (among other ethical issues discussed in the next
section), though he did not mention either Justice by name.166

163. Id. at 884.
164. Chief Justice’s Year-End Reports on the Federal Judiciary, SUPREME CT. OF THE U.S.,
www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/year-endreports.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
165. Justice Thomas’s wife had formed a lobbying group to fight the President’s health care law.
Mike Sacks, Justice Elena Kagan in Health Care Case?, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 18, 2011, 7:45 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/18/supreme-court-health-care-justice-elena-kaganrecusal_n_1102337.html.
166. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., YEAR END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7 (2011),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf.
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The Chief Justice began by stating that the “Justices follow the
same general principles respecting recusal as other federal judges, but
the application of those principles can differ due to the unique
circumstances of the Supreme Court.”167 He then summarized many
of the principles of recusal set forth in the applicable laws and
intimated that the Justices take these rules seriously. Chief Justice
Roberts then distinguished the Supreme Court Justices from lower
court judges:
Although a Justice’s process for considering recusal is
similar to that of the lower court judges, the Justice must
consider an important factor that is not present in the lower
courts. Lower court judges can freely substitute for one
another. If an appeals court or district court judge
withdraws from a case, there is another federal judge who
can serve in that recused judge’s place. But the Supreme
Court consists of nine Members who always sit together,
and if a Justice withdraws from a case, the Court must sit
without its full membership. A Justice accordingly cannot
withdraw from a case as a matter of convenience or simply
to avoid controversy. Rather, each Justice has an obligation
to the Court to be sure of the need to recuse before deciding
to withdraw from a case.168
Justice Roberts is correct that a Justice should not recuse herself
from a case simply “as a matter of convenience or simply to avoid a
controversy.”169 But his statement that “the Supreme Court consists
of nine Members who always sit together, and if a Justice withdraws
from a case, the Court must sit without its full membership,” does not
necessarily justify a different and more lax recusal requirement for
Supreme Court Justices.170 The requirements of judicial fairness and
impartiality are central to the rule of law and a fair justice system.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Yet, the “duty to sit” has also been expressed by other Justices. For
example, in a rare opinion issued by a justice in a recusal matter,
Justice Scalia justified his decision to stay on a case involving thenVice President Dick Cheney partly on the grounds that, although
lower court judges should possibly “resolve any doubts in favor of
recusal,” because if they so recuse, their places would be “taken by
another judge,” on “the Supreme Court . . . the consequence is
different: The Court proceeds with eight Justices, raising the
possibility that, by reason of a tie vote, it will find itself unable to
resolve the significant legal issue presented by the case.”171 Justice
Scalia also argued that Supreme Court Justices should have different
recusal standards than other judges because, when a Justice recuses
herself, that is the equivalent of a vote against the party who lost the
case who needs five votes out of nine to reverse the decision because
after the recusal of a Justice, the moving party only has an eightJustice Court.172
The problems with the notion that Supreme Court Justices should
have different recusal standards than lower court judges because they
cannot be replaced are two-fold. First, there is no basis in
constitutional text, history, or case law to assume that it is inevitable
that a Supreme Court Justice could not be replaced by either another
living justice or possibly a random alternating panel of lower court
judges. That Article III of our Constitution provides there “shall” be
“one Supreme Court,” does not mean that the Court has to be made
up of the same nine identical judges for every case that is heard.
Professors Michael Dorf and Lisa McElroy have argued that reading
the Constitution to require that the same nine Justices must hear
every case would be an overly formalistic reading of Article III and
inconsistent with the best reading of text and history.173 Second, if
the phrase “one Supreme Court,” means the same Justices have to
hear every case, then every recusal would be unconstitutional.174 The
171. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 915 (2004).
172. Id. at 915–16.
173. McElroy & Dorf, supra note 77, at 107–12; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
174. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial [p]ower of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court . . . .”); McElroy & Dorf, supra note 77, at 110–11.
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Constitution simply should not be interpreted to reach such a bizarre
interpretation.
In sum, there are numerous problems with how the Supreme Court
currently handles recusal issues. The current recusal process (1) does
not provide for a full adversarial hearing, (2) does not implicate a
known body of written case law, (3) usually does not result in a
written decision by the judge sought to be recused, and (4) there is no
formal appeal of the decision to other judges. All of the important
protections and safeguards built into the normal litigation process are
missing from the Justices’ recusal disputes.
To those who care about transparency, the Supreme Court recusal
process is fundamentally flawed. In her excellent article, Professor
Frost offered solutions to improve the process.175 First, the law
should be amended to give parties an official time period within
which to file recusal motions after first receiving information that the
judge hearing their case may be biased or suffer from a conflict of
interest.176 Second, judges should be required to disclose information
to the parties that may lead to the appearance of impropriety. Third,
the law should require that no judge be the judge of his own
recusal.177 At the Supreme Court level, this would mean that recusal
motions should be resolved by the eight other Justices (or possibly a
changing subcommittee of the Court). Fourth and finally, but perhaps
most importantly, judges should be required to give written reasons
for the grant or denial of a motion to recuse.178 This statement of
reasons can be short in easy cases, but the public’s faith in the
judicial process would be greatly increased by judges being
transparent about the reasons they recuse or not in hard cases.179 This
requirement is especially important in the case of Supreme Court
Justices, given that there is no appellate review of a Justice’s decision
to participate in a case.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See Frost, supra note 62, at 581–90.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 583–84
Id. at 589–90.
Id.
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III. ETHICAL RULES
Congress has passed a comprehensive set of ethical rules
governing the off-the-bench activities of lower federal court judges.
These rules prohibit federal judges from taking part in political
activity,180 accepting certain gifts,181 and being the keynote speaker
or guest of honor at dinners182 and receptions for political
organizations.183 The overriding purpose of these detailed regulations
is announced in the introduction of the ethical rules:
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to
justice in our society. A judge should maintain and enforce
high standards of conduct and should personally observe
those standards, so that the integrity and independence of
the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code
should be construed and applied to further that objective.184
Despite those noble objectives, the Supreme Court of the United
States is not formally governed by these or any other rules governing
their off-the-bench activities.185 In his 2011 year-end report, Chief
180. CODE
OF
CONDUCT
FOR
UNITED
STATES
JUDGES,
Canon
5
(2011),
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges. The code states:
(A) General Prohibitions. A judge should not:
(1) act as a leader or hold any office in a political organization;
(2) make speeches for a political organization or candidate, or publicly
endorse or oppose a candidate for public office; or
(3) solicit funds for, pay an assessment to, or make a contribution to a
political organization or candidate, or attend or purchase a ticket for a
dinner or other event sponsored by a political organization or
candidate.
(B) Resignation upon Candidacy. A judge should resign the judicial office if the
judge becomes a candidate in a primary or general election for any office.
(C) Other Political Activity. A judge should not engage in any other political
activity. This provision does not prevent a judge from engaging in activities
described in Canon 4.
Id.
181. Id. at Canon 4D(4).
182. Id. at Canon 4C.
183. Id. at Canon 5A.
184. Id. at Canon 1.
185. ROBERTS, supra note 166, at 3.
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Justice Roberts argued that, because Article III of the Constitution
requires that there “shall” be one Supreme Court, but that Congress
may “from time to time” create lower federal courts, nobody other
than the Court itself can make rules for the Justices.186 The Chief also
said that the Justices, by internal memoranda, have voluntarily agreed
to follow the financial disclosure and gift regulations in the rules, but
that the rest of the Code, including the sections about public
appearances, are not binding on the Justices albeit they are a “starting
point and a key source of guidance for the Justices.”187
Justice Roberts’s 2011 report on the ethical obligations (or lack
thereof) of the Justices is troubling. Why would the Justices agree to
be bound by some of those rules (binding on all other federal judges)
but not others? Additionally, Justice Roberts’s conclusion that the
Justices are completely free to adopt, or not, any ethical rules they
see fit—no matter what Congress says—is highly questionable.
Although the Constitution does require a Supreme Court,188 Congress
is free within broad limits to shape the Court’s appellate jurisdiction
(which is almost the Court’s entire jurisdiction) as Congress sees fit.
Article III provides that the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction “with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the
Congress shall make.”189 If Congress can shape, limit, or perhaps
even remove the Court’s entire appellate jurisdiction, why can it not
adopt reasonable “regulations” governing the Court’s ethical duties?
There may be some limits to that power or Congress could
potentially emasculate the Court through extreme regulation, but
Justice Roberts never adequately explained why the quite rational
ethical rules now in place that bind other federal judges are beyond
Congress’s power.
The Justices’ decision not to be bound by the same rules governing
lower court judges has led to a number of controversies surrounding
their off-the-bench activities. For example, Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito regularly participate in numerous events (and de facto fund
186.
187.
188.
189.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; ROBERTS, supra note 166, at 4.
ROBERTS, supra note 166, at 5.
U.S. CONST. art. III., § 1.
U.S. CONST. art. III., § 2.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss4/1

34

Segall: Invisible Justices

2016]

INVISIBLE JUSTICES

821

raisers) for conservative organizations.190 In both January 2007 and
January 2008, Justices Scalia and Thomas attended meetings
sponsored by the politically-active Koch brothers at a posh resort in
Southern California.191 Justice Alito has spoken at dinners held by
the politically conservative magazine, the American Spectator.192 The
Code of Ethics for lower courts prohibits judges from participating in
fundraising activities, or using or permitting “the use of the prestige
of judicial office for that purpose.”193 If the Court were bound by
those rules, it is at best unclear whether these Justices could have
engaged in those activities.
For the last few years, the conservative Justices have also
repeatedly been invited to be special guests of the annual conference
of the Federalist Society, a prominent organization dedicated, in its
own words, to
[R]eordering priorities within the legal system to place a
premium on individual liberty, traditional values, and the
rule of law [and] restoring the recognition of the
importance of these norms among lawyers, judges, law
students and professors. In working to achieve these goals,
the Society has created a conservative and libertarian
intellectual network that extends to all levels of the legal
community.194
On the Federalist Society’s own website, Justice Roberts
introduces a tribute video to the organization celebrating its twentyfifth anniversary.195 The video proclaims our Constitution’s
190. R. Jeffrey Smith, Professors Ask Congress for an Ethics Code for Supreme Court, WASH. POST
(Feb. 23, 2011, 10:40 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/23/AR201
1022304975.html; Rmuse, Justices Thomas and Scalia Violate Judicial Ethics by Headlining Right
Wing Fundraisers, POLITICUSUSA (Nov. 16, 2013, 11:59 AM), http://www.politicususa.com/2013/
11/16/justices-thomas-scalia-violate-judicial-ethics-headlining-wing-fundraisers.html.
191. Smith, supra note 190.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. ABOUT US: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, http://www.fed-soc.org/aboutus (last visited Apr. 14,
2016).
195. The Federalist Society, 25th Anniversary Tribute Video, YOUTUBE (Nov. 15 2007),
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“preference for free markets rather than centralized government
control,” and discusses the “wrong turn” taken by many “liberal
professors” who discuss issues in “only one way.”196
The Federalist Society is home to many nationally famous
conservative members, including Randy Barnett, the Georgetown law
professor who devised much of the litigation strategy in the first
Obamacare case, and numerous other law professors who
consistently file amicus briefs in the Supreme Court on hotly debated
constitutional issues such as abortion, affirmative action, and
campaign finance reform.197
In addition to attending the national convention of this
organization on numerous occasions, Justice Thomas was the 2013
keynote speaker featured at the main dinner with an audience
exceeding 1,000 people, including Justices Scalia and Alito.198 A
lower court judge probably could not have played that role given the
federal prohibition on such judges being the keynote speaker or guest
of honor at dinners and receptions for political organizations.199 It is
one thing for the Justices to give talks to diverse academic and civic
organizations, but quite another for them to lend their public persona
on numerous occasions to an organization whose very mission is to
further a conservative and libertarian constitutional agenda.
Of course, not only conservative Justices frequently visit academic
and civic organizations with a decided political tilt. Justices Breyer,
Sotomayor, Stevens, and Ginsburg have all been featured speakers at
the liberal American Constitutional Society obviously helping that
organization raise funds for its many causes.200
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PEsxcuP-Sv4.
196. Id.
197. EXPERTS: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, http://www.fed-soc.org/experts/ (last visited Apr. 14,
2016).
198. See 2013 NATIONAL LAWYERS CONVENTION: EVENTS: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY,
http://www.fed-soc.org/events/detail/2013-national-lawyers-convention (last visited Apr. 14, 2016);
David Lat, Justice Clarence Thomas Speaks!, ABOVE THE LAW (Nov. 15, 2013, 1:34 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/11/justice-clarence-thomas-speaks-and-oh-what-a-speech/.
199. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, supra note 180.
200. Michael McGough, Opinion, Are Supreme Court Justices Becoming “Party Judges?”, L.A.
TIMES (May 14, 2014, 3:16 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-supreme-courtbishops-partisanship-20140514-story.html.
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Regardless of whether these Justices have actually violated the
ethical obligations applicable to lower federal judges, the Court’s
dismissive attitude towards those rules is highly disturbing,
especially when it comes to the public’s perception of the Court’s
commitment to the rule of law. Over the last few years, over onehundred public interest organizations,201 and a group of over onehundred law professors, have formally asked that the Court fully
embrace all of the ethical rules binding on lower court judges.202 The
executive vice-president of one of those public interest organizations
stated that “[t]he nation’s highest court shouldn’t have the lowest
ethical standards.”203 Additionally, [a]pplying the Code of Conduct to
the Supreme Court is a common sense move that will help ensure that
Americans can count on basic fairness throughout our judicial
system.”204
Congresswomen Louise Slaughter, who has sponsored legislation
attempting to place the Court under the same rules as other courts,
has put it this way: “[U]nlike all other federal judges, the justices of
the U.S. Supreme Court are not bound by a code of ethics.”205 In light
of this long-term public outcry over the ethical practices of the
Supreme Court, Justice Roberts’s 2011 year-end report was even
more disheartening.206 His “trust us because we are good people
approach” to this problem is unsatisfactory, especially because the
public comes to trust the Justices through the Court’s actions, not
merely its words. After all, the hundreds of lower court judges
actually bound by the ethics rules were also nominated by the
President and confirmed by the Senate and are supposed to be men
and women of good character and strong ethics. Yet, they must
follow sensible guidelines governing their off-the-court activities.
Supreme Court Justices should not be treated differently.
201. Lisa Graves, Supremely Unseemly Conduct by Supreme Court Justices Spurs Call for Mandatory
Ethics Rules, PR WATCH (Jan. 9 2012, 1:10 PM), http://www.prwatch.org/NODE/11226.
202. Smith, supra note 190.
203. Graves, supra note 201.
204. Id.
205. Ethics and Accountability, CONGRESSWOMAN LOUISE M. SLAUGHTER, http://www.louise.
house.gov/issues/ethics (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
206. Roberts, supra note 166.
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The public needs to have faith in its judicial system—especially
the highest Court in the land. If anything, the nine Justices of that
Court should be bound by more detailed and tougher ethical
guidelines than lower court judges who number in the hundreds.
Indispensable elements of a just and transparent Court are that the
Justices engage in ethical off-the-Court activities, and that they
explain difficult recusal questions transparently and openly. Congress
should add the Justices to the ethical statutes covering lower federal
court judges. As I said in the Los Angeles Times shortly after Justice
Roberts issued his 2011 report, “this request for blind allegiance and
judicial silence smacks of hubris.”207 The American people deserve
better.
IV. THE MYSTERIOUS WRIT OF CERTIORARI
[T]he screening function is inextricably linked to the
fulfillment of the Court’s essential duties and is vital to the
effective performance of the Court’s unique mission “to
define the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, to assure
the uniformity of federal law, and to maintain the
constitutional distribution of powers in our federal system.”
Justice William Brennan208
Every year the Supreme Court of the United States receives over
7,500 requests from litigants who have lost their lawsuits in the lower
courts and seek reversal of those decisions.209 Lawyers spend
thousands of hours working on briefs supporting those requests, and
the parties pay those lawyers significant amounts of money. In recent
years, the Court has granted approximately seventy-five to eighty of
those requests per year.210
207. Eric J. Segall, Op-Ed, An Ominous Silence on the Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/12/opinion/la-oe-segall-kagan-recusal-20120212.
208. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential
Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 394 (2004).
209. The Judicial Branch, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/judicial-branch
(last visited Apr. 16, 2016).
210. Frequently Asked Questions, SUPREME CT. OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/
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Our country has a strong, vested interest in which cases the Court
deems worthy of its attention because those cases may well dictate
national policy across the spectrum of important social, legal,
educational, political, and economic issues. Yet, despite the public
significance of the certiorari process, the Justices decide which cases
to hear “according to vague guidelines that afford them maximum
discretion, based on very little collegial deliberation, with virtually
no public disclosure or explanation of their actions and subject to no
precedential constraints.”211
Although there are instructions concerning the timing and structure
of the briefs that need to be submitted,212 and some vague
considerations the Court may take into account in the process of
deciding whether a case is worthy of its attention,213 there are no
rules or statutes governing exactly how many Justices it takes to hear
a case or any other important issues surrounding the writ of
certiorari.214 The present informal practice is that it takes four
Justices to agree to grant certiorari for a case to be heard.215 The
Justices keep secret who votes to grant the petitions and never
provide reasons for denying a petition to hear a case, though
dissenting Justices will occasionally write separately to argue that a
petition that did not get four votes should have been granted.216 No
formal record of the votes to grant or deny certiorari is ever
published.217
There are many important things we do not know about the
mysterious writ of certiorari, but one thing is certain: how the
faq.aspx#faqgi9 (last visited Apr. 16, 2016).
211. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 208, at 390.
212. See SUP. CT. R. 15 & 29, http://www.supremecourt.gov/ctrules/2013RulesoftheCourt.pdf
(providing wide-ranging rules from detailed formatting requirements to content restrictions).
213. Id. at 10. Rule 10 sets forth a number of considerations including whether there has been a circuit
split on the issue, whether the decision decided an important issue of federal law, or whether the
decision is inconsistent with other decisions of the Court. In the rule, the Court makes clear that these
criteria are “neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion . . . .” Id.
214. See id. at 10−16.
215. See Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federalcourts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1 (last visited Feb.
Apr. 20, 2016).
216. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 208, at 402.
217. Id.
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Justices decide which of the very few cases, out of the thousands
coming from the lower courts, they select to hear is more akin to the
“Star Chamber” model of judging than an open and transparent
process befitting a representative democracy.218
A. What Cases do the Justices Have to Hear?
Article III of the Constitution divides the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction into original and appellate jurisdiction.219 In the landmark
case of Marbury v. Madison,220 the Court held that it could not
exercise original jurisdiction (even if Congress wanted it to) except in
the three narrow categories expressly set forth in Article III: cases
involving ambassadors, other “public [m]inisters and [c]onsuls,” and
where a state is a party.221 In all other cases, most of which arise
under federal law or the Constitution, the Court has appellate
jurisdiction.222 Although Congress cannot add to the Court’s original
jurisdiction, the Justices can (and do) send cases within their original
jurisdiction to the lower courts for review first if they so desire.223
Virtually all of the cases the Court hears are pursuant to its appellate
jurisdiction.224
From the time the Constitution was ratified until 1925, the
Supreme Court had to hear most cases within the jurisdiction that
Congress granted.225 This was not a huge problem until the late
nineteenth century when the country began industrializing and
Congress enacted many new laws leading to increased federal

218. The Star Chamber was a court of law that sat at the Palace of Westminster that held trials in
secret. Daniel L. Vande Zande, Coercive Power and the Demise of the Star Chamber, 50 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 326, 326 (2010) (stating that “[t]he English Court of the Star Chamber is subject to an enduring
legacy, having become a synonym for secrecy, severity and extreme injustice”). It has been described as
having “stripped the delinquent of his constitutional defence . . . and left him open to the capricious and
tyrannical will and humour of arbitrary judges . . . .” THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER, OR SEAT OF
OPPRESSION 9 (1768).
219. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
220. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
221. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
222. Id.
223. Supreme Court Procedures, supra note 215.
224. Id.
225. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 208, at 392.
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litigation.226 The Justices at that time lobbied to have more discretion
in their caseload, leading to the Judiciary Act of 1925,227 which was
also called “The Judges’ Bill” because of who worked hard to get it
passed.228 This law gave the Justices more control over their docket
selection, but still required them to resolve all cases on appeal where
a federal court struck down a state law or a state court rejected a
federal claim asserted by the plaintiff.229 The Justices eventually
found a way to evade this mandatory appellate jurisdiction by
frequently deciding cases with summary affirmances, meaning on the
basis of the opinion by the lower court.230 Eventually, in 1988, the
Justices achieved what they had long wanted—the almost complete
abolition of its mandatory jurisdiction.231
Today, the Supreme Court has almost 100% control over its own
docket, a power wielded by only a few other courts.232 For example,
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
230. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 208, 393–94.
231. The Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
232. The spectrum of discretion regarding certiorari is evidenced by courts throughout the globe. The
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has little discretion in denying cases, but is able to alleviate its
docket by a rigorous screening process:
[T]he Court’s procedure still reflects the strongly held and perhaps quixotic
view—dating back to the era of the Court’s origins—that every person filing a
Constitutional Complaint is, in principle, entitled to a decision on the merits.
As a result, the overwhelming majority of decisions of the
Constitutional Court are not rendered by a full Senate, but rather by three-judge
committees (Kammern) whose task is to screen and decide most of these
Constitutional Complaints. These screening committees function in the following
manner: if a committee finds that a Constitutional Complaint is clearly without
merit—or if it is otherwise unacceptable on certain other grounds—the committee
dismisses the Complaint. If, in contrast, the committee finds that the Complaint is
clearly meritorious, it may issue a decision in favor of the complainant. In both
kinds of cases, the committee’s decision must be unanimous, and it is
unreviewable.
Peter E. Quint, Leading a Constitutional Court: Perspectives from the Federal Republic of Germany,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1862 (2006) (internal footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court of South Korea,
however, must decide all appeals. Jin Yeong Chung & Sungjean Seo, Litigation and Enforcement in
South Korea: Overview, PRACTICAL LAW, http://us.practicallaw.com/8-381-3681 (last updated Aug. 1,
2015). Canada’s justices, however, have a level of discretion regarding certiorari comparable to the
United States Supreme Court justices. See Benjamin Alarie & Andrew J. Green, Docket Control at the
Supreme Court of Canada: What’s Behind the Screen? 3 (Chicago Law School Workshop on Judicial
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the United States Courts of Appeals have to hear virtually every case
appealed from the federal trial courts.233 Whereas twenty percent of
the cases heard by the Supreme Court of Canada come to the justices
through mandatory jurisdiction,234 our Supreme Court, by contrast,
almost never has to hear a case.235
That our Supreme Court has virtually unfettered discretion to
decide which cases it will hear suggests that the process for those
decisions should be open and transparent. If the justices had little
control over their docket, like most other courts, there would be less
need to understand what factors go into the decision-making process.
Because the Supreme Court decides whether to hear cases pursuant to
vague and often unknowable criteria, subjective to each justice,
however, the public should know as much as possible about that
process. In truth, we know very little.
B. What We Do Not Know
The most troubling aspect of the process through which the Court
decides which cases to hear is that the Justices do not identify which
of them voted to hear a case.236 Moreover, the Court has never
explained why it keeps the votes on whether to grant a writ of
certiorari secret from the American people.237 It is perhaps
understandable why the Court would not disclose the votes for the
7,500 or so cases the Court decides not to hear (given the
administrative burden that it would place on the Court), but why not
disclose such information for the seventy-five or so cases the Court
does decide to hear? There are strong arguments that this information
is important and relevant to public discussion.

Behavior, Draft Paper, Mar. 20, 2014) http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/alarie_docket_control.pdf
(“There is a process by which justices not on the panel can object to decisions to grant or deny leave, but
the decision is ultimately up to the three panel members.”).
233. Appeals, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/typescases/appeals (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
234. Alarie & Green, supra note 232.
235. Supreme Court Procedures, supra note 215
236. Segall, supra note 5.
237. See id.
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For example, it is well accepted that, prior to Justice Scalia’s
death, Justice Kennedy was the all-important swing vote on the Court
in most important areas of constitutional law including abortion and
affirmative action.238 The conventional wisdom was that there were
four conservative Justices on the Court both ready to end affirmative
action on a national basis and to return the issue of abortion to the
states, whereas there were four liberal votes to allow the states to use
affirmative action but also to protect the right to choose from state
prohibition.239 Numerous abortion and affirmative action cases were
brought to the Court, and we have no idea how Justice Kennedy (or
any other Justice) voted on the certiorari questions in any of them.240
When the Court decided to hear the cases, knowing whether Kennedy
was one of the four (or more) votes in favor of hearing the case might
have been extremely relevant information to the parties and to the
public.241 Lawyers litigate these important cases in the lower courts
with an eye towards the swing Justices on the Court and write the
briefs that are filed in the Supreme Court in the same way. Knowing
which Justices wanted to hear a case that has been granted, and
which did not, might provide valuable information for the lawyers
and the parties.
The public should also be able to trace the Justices’ certiorari votes
over time to better hold these public officials accountable for their
important governmental decisions. At the moment, the public can
make statements about the Court as an institution and the cases it
decides to hear, but we have no way of assessing the work of each
individual Justice when it comes to their certiorari votes. That is
contrary to how democracies and representative governments are
supposed to work.
Are there valid reasons why the Justices’ votes on the certiorari
issue should be secret? What plausible justifications could there be
238. Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed, With Kennedy as Swing Vote, High Court Could Veer Right, NAT’L
LAW JOURNAL (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202738849712/OpEd-WithKennedy-as-Swing-Vote-High-Court-Could-Veer-Right?slreturn=20151110165057.
239. Id.
240. See Segall, supra note 5.
241. Id.
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for prohibiting the public from knowing this information? The author
of this article has asked many experts this question, and the answer
seems only to be, “well it has always been that way.”242 That, of
course, is not a good reason.
Some might argue that, if the certiorari votes are disclosed, the
public might mistake a vote to hear or not to hear a case as a strong
indicator of that Justices’ views on the merits of that case. But even if
that is likely to happen, the cure is more information about the
process, not secret votes. As a general rule, the government is not
allowed to hide relevant, truthful information from the American
people simply because the information might be misinterpreted.243 In
addition, disclosing the votes after the case is decided (not ideal but
better) would solve that problem.244
This aspect of the Court’s decision making, that they do not reveal
which Justices vote to hear a granted case, symbolizes the entire
problem this article tries to capture: there should be (and usually is) a
strong presumption in our democratic society that government
processes be open and transparent.245 When it comes to Congress and
the president, there are strict disclosure requirements, including openrecords laws and televised proceedings, and when the elected
branches want to keep secrets, we place the burden of proof on them
to demonstrate the need for that secrecy.246 But with the Supreme
Court, there seems to be an assumption of secrecy and anonymity.
This presumption should be changed. The Justices perform an
immensely important public duty that affects all Americans when
they decide which cases to hear. Why should they cast this vote in
secrecy with no accountability?

242. Justice Stevens gave a talk at Georgia State College of Law in 2014 and said he had never
considered in thirty-five years why the certiorari votes are secret but it was probably because “it has
always been that way.” John Paul Stevens, Henry J. Miller Lecture, Question and Answer Session (Apr.
16, 2014) (audio on file with Georgia State Law Library).
243. See Segall, supra note 5.
244. I thank Akhil Amar for that idea.
245. Transparency and Open Government: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 15, 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009).
246. See, e.g., Kathy Bradley, Do You Feel the Sunshine? Government in the Sunshine Act: Its
Objectives, Goals, and Effect on the FCC and You, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 473, 477 (1997).
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Another troubling aspect of the certiorari process is the influential
role the Justices’ law clerks play in the decisions. The certiorari pool,
originally the idea of Justice Lewis F. Powell, was developed in
1972, and divides all of the petitions for certiorari equally between
the nine Justices.247 Rather than having nine clerks, one from each
chamber, review a certiorari petition and write a memorandum with a
recommendation, “one clerk prepares a [single] memorandum that is
then circulated to all of the Justices participating in the pool.”248
Today all but Justice Alito participate in the pool.249 With the help of
these memos, the Justices decide which cases will be discussed in
conference, and therefore, which may eventually be heard.250 The
certiorari pool gives the clerks tremendous influence, transforming
them from helpers and staffers to “active decision maker[s].”251
Scholars have debated whether the certiorari pool process leads the
Justices to grant fewer petitions than before the pool began, because
young law clerks might be reluctant to suggest to their bosses that
cases be heard.252 There is no question that the Court grants fewer
petitions than it used to, but other factors may be at work. One of the
problems with making any kind of general statement about the role of
law clerks in the process is that we know little about their
involvement other than the general scheme outlined here. We do not
know how much deference the Justices give the certiorari memos,
how each Justice uses the memos, or how often the Justices disregard
or accept the recommendations in the memos. And, of course, the
247. David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari
Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 953 (2007) (reviewing TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE
PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006) and ARTEMUS WARD
& DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT (2006)).
248. Id. at 972.
249. Adam Liptak, A Second Justice Opts Out of a Longtime Custom: The ‘Cert. Pool’, N. Y. TIMES
(Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/washington/26memo.html?_r=0.
250. See id.
251. ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS
AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 23 (2006).
252. See Stras, supra note 247, at 969–72. For example, Edward Lazaurs, a clerk for Justice
Blackmun, recounted the anecdote that he “doubt[ed] the Court granted any cert[iorari] petitions
because of something clerks did and, if some clerks did manage to bury a few cases along the way, the
same issues, assuming they were worth the Court’s time, were sure to resurface.” Id. at 969–70.

Published by Reading Room, 2016

45

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 1

832

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:4

Justices do not reveal who votes for or against granting the petition in
any given case.253
Given all of these uncertainties, all we can say is that the process
through which the Court decides which cases to hear and which cases
not to hear is opaque, non-transparent, and largely secret. The only
real sources of information are the very few tales told by former law
clerks and the occasional dissent from the Court’s denial of a
petition. Given the importance of a decision whether or not the
Justices will vote to hear a case, their votes, at least on the cases
where they grant the petition, ought to be public and the Court should
be forthcoming on the precise roles their law clerks play in the
process.
V. THE JUSTICES’ OFFICIAL RECORDS
It would seem obvious that any papers and other materials
which are generated by persons on the public
payroll . . . doing the government’s business, should belong
to the government . . . It would seem further that any
memoranda, tapes, and drafts generated in the production
of such documents or other materials for the same reasons
should also be the property of the United States. In short, if
the government paid the cost of production of the papers or
other materials they should belong to the government.
Federal Judge J. Skelly Wright254
Partly because of the many ways that Supreme Court Justices are
inaccessible during their official years on the Court, seeing their
official papers is often the only way we can truly understand a
Justice’s career and evaluate how she served the public. Our
historical accounts of the Court are often greatly enriched when a
Justice’s personal files are released to the public after they are no
253. See Segall, supra note 5.
254. SUSAN LOW BLOCH, VICKI C. JACKSON & THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER, INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT: THE INSTITUTION AND ITS PROCEDURES 1044 (2d ed. 2008).
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longer on the bench. Unfortunately, the Justices more often than not
deprive the American public of that information for generations, and
sometimes forever.
For example, shortly before the 1986–1987 Supreme Court term
began, Justice Byron White, who had been on the Supreme Court for
twenty-five years, came to work on the weekend and, with the help of
law clerks, destroyed many of his official files.255 According to his
biographer, they bought a shredding machine for that specific
purpose.256 Several of the files lost to history were labeled “Miranda
v. Arizona” the landmark Supreme Court case where the Justices
ruled that criminal defendants have “the right to remain silent.”257
One of his law clerks at the time reportedly remarked “I couldn’t
believe how much history was going down the chute.”258
Supreme Court Justices are government employees who make
public decisions and are paid out of taxpayer funds. Yet, the Justices
are under no legal obligation to maintain their records and files,
compiled sometimes over many decades, for historical study and
national record keeping.259 Whereas the president’s official papers
are subject to detailed recording and safekeeping requirements
pursuant to the Presidential Records Act,260 the Justices each have
their own idiosyncratic policies regarding their official documents.261
The result is that many important and official papers are often lost to
history for extended and unnecessary periods of time and sometimes,
as was the case with Justice White’s papers, forever.262 This is one
more example of how the Justices are less transparent than other
governmental officials, even the President of the United States.
The Court retains records kept for every case including the
transcripts and audio recordings of the oral arguments and the
255. JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN
CULTURAL TREASURES 95 (1999).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Kathryn A. Watts, Judges and Their Papers, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1665, 1678 (2013).
260. Presidential Records Ac of 1978t, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–07 (2012). This act mandates that all
presidential records received and created after January 20, 1981, are to be preserved. Id.
261. Watts, supra note 259, at 1678.
262. Id. at 1685.
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briefs.263 But each Justice also compiles personal notes, draft
opinions, memoranda, and communications with other Justices and
their law clerks which are of vital historical and public significance
but for which there are no official rules.264 In a comprehensive law
review article, Professor Kathryn Watts detailed the history leading
to the current state of affairs where the Justices have complete
control over these records, and she proposed a few solutions to
remedy the problem.265 I owe a great debt to Professor Watts for
much of the information contained in this Part.266
A. The Justices’ Practices
In 1993, shortly after Justice Thurgood Marshall’s papers were
promptly released to the country only two years after his retirement
(a rare occurrence), Congress held hearings to discuss whether there
should be uniform procedures governing the maintenance and release
of the papers of Supreme Court Justices.267 The hearing was
prompted at least in part by several interesting and noteworthy
bombshells in Marshall’s papers, such as the fact that the Court was
once extremely close to reversing Roe v. Wade, and the concern that
the untimely release of the papers could jeopardize the workings of
the Court.268 After much study, however, Congress ended up taking
no action leaving in place the current hodgepodge of procedures used
by different Justices depending on their own personal
predilections.269
Justice Marshall made his papers public quickly and expeditiously,
but he is certainly the exception. For example, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor gave her papers to the Library of Congress upon the
263. Id. at 1674.
264. Id. at 1674–75.
265. See generally id.
266. Professor Watts covers the papers of both lower court judges and the justices in her fine paper.
This Chapter only discusses the papers of the latter.
267. Watts, supra note 259, at 1670–71.
268. Id. at 1968.
269. Id. at 1690–91. Historically, the justices of the nineteenth century took little care to preserve
their papers. This attitude may have been sparked to some extent by the great Chief Justice John
Marshall who believed Court secrecy was of vital importance and left no personal records or papers
behind him when he died. Id.at 1678, 1681.
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conditions that they remain sealed until her death and that individual
case files must remain closed “during the service of any justice who
participated in the case.”270 Given that she served with Justice
Clarence Thomas,271 who may well serve twenty to thirty more years,
this means that valuable historical information might be sealed for at
least a generation. Moreover, for much of her tenure on the Court,
Justice O’Connor played the role of swing Justice.272 In areas like
affirmative action, abortion, campaign finance reform, and the
separation of church and state, she wrote key concurring decisions
dictating the results in those cases.273 She also often negotiated and
bargained with other Justices to change their minds in these most
controversial areas of constitutional law.274 There is little possibility
of having an accurate historical understanding of the relationships of
the Justices during the twenty-six years she served on the bench
without access to her papers. This failure makes it much more
difficult for Court watchers and historians to have a satisfactory
understanding of the many years where Justice O’Connor was a key
player on the Supreme Court.
Justice Felix Frankfurter once observed that, to understand the
United States Supreme Court, it is necessary to know the “private
rehearsals . . . behind the impenetrable draperies of judicial
secrecy.”275 What a shame that Justice William Brennan, who served
on the Supreme Court for thirty-four years, and was the liberal
wing’s leader for most of that time, gave a single biographer
exclusive access to his papers for almost twenty years.276 There is no
plausible reason one person should be allowed exclusive access to the
public papers of one of the most long-serving and influential
Supreme Court Justices in our history.

270. Id. at 1682 n.92.
271. Julie Graves Krishnaswami, Reflecting on Sandra Day O’Connor’s Jurisprudence Relating to
Race and Education, 57 CATH. U.L. REV. 1099, 1110 n.20 (2008).
272. Id. at 1137.
273. Id.
274. See id.
275. BLOCH, supra note 254, at 1041.
276. Watts, supra note 259, at 1683.
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Numerous other Justices have been equally protective of their
papers. Justice Souter’s papers are sealed for fifty years.277 Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger’s papers were donated by his son to the
College of William and Mary in 1996, but they cannot be opened
until 2026.278 Given the Chief’s administrative responsibilities, and in
light of how forcefully he often exercised those duties, we can only
assume there is a treasure trove of interesting and enlightening
information in those files that has little to do with the decision of
actual cases. What a shame that court commentators, scholars, and
reporters have been locked out of those papers.
We do not know what kinds of policies concerning their records
and papers the current Justices will leave behind (recently deceased
Justice Scalia apparently left behind no preferences about what to do
with his papers so his family will have to decide), but if history and
prior practice are our guides, it is more than likely that many of them
will adopt secretive rules for these vital historical materials.
Moreover, under the current regime, the Justices may destroy any and
all of their personal papers, memoranda, and e-mails. Something
needs to be done to protect these valuable governmental records.
B. The Presidential Records Act
Enacted in the wake of the Watergate controversy, the Presidential
Records Act (PRA) establishes that the official papers of the
president (and the vice-president) belong to the people of the United
States, not the men or women who happen to hold the offices of the
president and the vice-president.279 The law requires the archivist of
the United States to take custody of the president’s papers after he
leaves office.280 The president may destroy records with no
“administrative, historical, informational, or evidentiary value,
if . . . [he] obtains the views, in writing, of the Archivist concerning
277. Tony Mauro, Souter Blocks Access to his Papers for Fifty Years, NAT’L L. J. (Aug. 26, 2009),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202433393342/Souter-blocks-access-to-his-papers-for-50years.
278. Watts, supra note 259, at 1684.
279. Id. at 1669, 1673; 44 U.S.C. § 2202 (2012).
280. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(f)(1) (2012).
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the proposed disposal of such Presidential records.”281 The PRA also
requires the president to take all practical steps to segregate personal
records from official presidential materials.282 As far as public access
is concerned, the PRA allows for public viewing of the presidential
records through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) beginning
five years after the president leaves office.283
Mindful that the president’s documents may be politically
sensitive or contain information that could damages the interests of
the United States if improperly released, the PRA does not require
disclosure of all presidential materials.284 Excluded for a period of
twelve years from the required disclosure are materials that contain
(1) sensitive foreign policy information, (2) personnel information
relating to federal appointments, (3) information required by other
statutes to remain secret (such as classified materials), (4) trade
secrets or private commercial information, (5) confidential
communications between the president and his advisers, and (6)
private personal information the disclosure of which would constitute
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.285
The PRA is not a perfect statute and has led to litigation over its
access and disclosure policies.286 In addition, President Bush delayed
the release of many of President Reagan’s materials through a
controversial Executive Order that President Obama repealed after
taking Office.287 The point, however, is that Congress made a good
faith effort to force the Executive Branch to take reasonable efforts to
preserve its official records and also made clear that those records
belonged to the public, not to the president. Congress should
undertake a similar project with regard to the Supreme Court of the

281. Id. at § 2203(c).
282. Id. at § 2201(3).
283. Id. at § 2204(b)(2).
284. Id. at § 2204(a).
285. Id.
286. See, e.g., Am. Historical Ass’n v. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., 516 F. Supp. 2d 90, 99
(D.D.C. 2007) (arguing that “that access to materials may be delayed for an unlimited period of time
after the expiration of the 12-year restriction period while a former president and the incumbent
president ‘review’ materials proposed for release”).
287. Exec. Order No. 13489, 74 Fed Reg. 4669 (Jan. 21, 2009).

Published by Reading Room, 2016

51

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 1

838

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:4

United States because the Justices do not seem to want to make their
own rules regarding their official records.
Some may argue that there are differences between the president
and the Supreme Court that make disclosure of the Justices’ records
harder to justify than disclosure of presidential materials. Most
significantly, perhaps, the Justices are supposed to speak only
through their written opinions while the president acts publicly much
of the time.288 This difference, however, does not lead to the
conclusion that the Justices’ papers should belong to them rather than
the public; at most it suggests that the law should treat the Justices’
papers differently. That the Justices hold their offices for life might
suggest the need for greater, not lesser, scrutiny of their official
records after they leave office given that they do not need public
approval to keep their jobs.
In any event, as with presidential papers, the official records of the
Justices are created, maintained, and used by governmental officials
performing public tasks and therefore should belong to the public.289
As Judge Carl McGowan of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit once remarked as to his papers: “I
can’t see any reason why . . . law clerks’ memoranda to me, my
memoranda to them, my memoranda to other judges on the case,
draft opinions, and notes . . . all that kind of thing . . . what’s in that
file . . . are [not] the property of the United States
Government . . . .”290
C. The Solution
In her comprehensive article on the need for legislation governing
the disposition of the papers of the Justices, Professor Watts suggests
that Congress legislatively decree that the papers of the Justices are
public property, but then work with the Judicial Office of the United

288. Watts, supra note 259, at 1692 n.168.
289. Id. at 1692.
290. Id. at 1692–93.
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States Courts to draft a statute governing the details of how those
documents should be kept and then disclosed.291
There are undoubtedly sensitive issues dealing with the details of
any mandatory record-keeping and disclosure rules. These issues
suggest the Justices themselves have significant input in the process.
The law would have to provide for rules governing “what papers
should be kept, where they should be deposited, and when they
should be released,” among other complicated questions.292 Including
the administrative arm of the Supreme Court in the drafting process
could alleviate separation of powers concerns potentially arising from
legislative efforts that dictate to the Justices how they must treat their
official papers.293 Therefore, it would be critical (though not
absolutely necessary) to have the Justices agree to these official rules
and including them in the process from the beginning would be the
best way to achieve that goal.
The societal benefits flowing from the required disclosure of the
Justices’ papers are easy to see. The increased transparency resulting
from such disclosure would help students of the Court study the
historical practices of the Justices, would allow for greater insights
into the inner workings of the Court and the relationships among the
Justices, would provide the public much better access to its highest
Court, and would allow for greater evaluation of the Court’s work,
which might translate into more meaningful public involvement in
future confirmations.
There are potential objections, however, to transferring the Court’s
papers from the Justices to the public. Professor Watts lists four such
objections in her article (1) possible “chilling effects,” (2) financial
expense, (3) threats to judicial independence and the separation of
powers, and (4) lack of federal regulation as to the Congress’s own
papers and records.294 Although these objections should be addressed
in any regulatory scheme dealing with the Justices’ records, they do
not justify a failure to ensure public access to those records.
291.
292.
293.
294.
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1. Chilling Effects
If Congress requires the Justices to maintain their official records
for eventual public disclosure, would that have the effect of chilling
how the Justices communicate to their staff, clerks, and other
Justices, as well as their maintenance of internal notes and
reflections? Predicting the future is always difficult, but it is unlikely
that the Justices would dramatically alter practices for several
reasons.
First, under the current system in which the Justices have complete
say over their own records, it is always a possibility that
communications between chambers will someday be made public by
one or more of the Justices.295 This possibility, however, has not
seemed to affect inter-office memoranda.296 After all, Justice
Marshall made his papers public two years after his death and the
materials contained much information about the Justices sitting at the
time; those disclosures, though controversial, did not cause the
Justices to significantly change their practices.297
Second, even as to those completely internal official notes,
communications with law clerks, and draft opinions, the Justices
have strong incentives to continue to create a written record of what
happens inside their chambers. They may want to affect how history
deals with their judicial records and they may want to make sure
there is a strong written record in case of law clerk disclosures or
other leaks to the media.298 Moreover, writing internal memoranda
and draft decisions are such integral methods of the decision-making
process of the Justices that it is hard to conceive that they would
dramatically alter them because of the possibility of ultimate
disclosure after they have left the bench.
Third, the experience under the Presidential Records Act does not
support the idea of a strong chilling effect.299 There is little or no
evidence that forced disclosure has altered the way the Executive
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id. at 1728.
Id. at 1727–28.
See id. at 1683, 1685.
Id. at 1728.
Id. at 1728–29.
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Branch conducts most of it business.300 In any event, such
speculations should not get in the way of requiring much needed
transparency. If there indeed are unforeseen chilling effects, they can
be addressed through administrative rules and further legislative
action.
2. Financial Costs
There is no doubt that there would be enormous expenses
associated with preserving, sorting, and ensuring public access to the
Justices’ papers. Even if those records were eventually stored in
private facilities such as colleges and libraries that were willing to
house them, there would still be great cost to the taxpayer. Can a
price tag really be placed, however, on the historical value these
materials would provide to the American people?
The Supreme Court is currently the least transparent of the three
branches of the federal government.301 The Justices almost never
appear on television in their official capacities, they rarely talk about
their work in a meaningful manner off the bench, and there are no
requirements that any of their pre-decisional records or files be
maintained for posterity. The only way we will ever have reasonable
insight into how the Justices interact with each other and their law
clerks is through their personal papers. And, without that
information, there is no plausible way to truly and fully evaluate the
role the individual Justices play in our political system.
3. Congress’s Failure to Regulate Itself
Although Congress has declared the president’s papers to be public
property and enacted legislation covering their maintenance and
release for public inspection, not surprisingly, Congress has not taken
the same step with respect to its own papers.302 Professor Watts raises
the issue of whether Congress would look self-serving if it required
300. Watts, supra note 259, at 1728–29.
301. Id. at 1669, 1703, 1733.
302. Id. at 1733.
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disclosure of the Court’s papers, as well as the president’s, while
refusing to saddle its own members with similar rules.303
This objection is easily answered. First, much of Congress’s work
is already in the public eye. It holds public hearings, its proceedings
are often televised, and there is a long and detailed legislative history
for many of the laws Congress enacts.304 Thus, Congress is far and
away already more transparent than the Supreme Court.
Second, Congress does require that all the records of each
congressional committee be transferred to the National Archives for
preservation.305
Third, and most importantly, Congress should address the issue of
who owns the records of each individual member and enact rules
governing public access to those materials. If requiring the Justices to
grant access were to generate public pressure for Congress to pass
similar rules for itself would be a positive development.
4. Separation of Powers
Some may argue that Congress does not possess the power to force
the Justices to make their papers public and that any rules regarding
the Judicial Branch’s papers must come from the Justices themselves.
This argument would be based on the traditional justifications for a
robust separation of powers doctrine. In order to better preserve
liberty, the founding fathers intended that each branch of government
be independent and strong enough to guard against encroachments of
the other two branches.306 As James Madison said, “The
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in
the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny.”307 On this issue, Madison and Jefferson
agreed, as reflected in this letter from the latter to the former:

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id. at 1732–33.
Id. at 1733.
Id.
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS: NO. 47, at 271 (James Madison) (Kathleen M. Sullivan ed., 2009).
Id.
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The principle of the Constitution is that of a separation of
Legislative, Executive and Judiciary functions, except in
cases specified. If this principle be not expressed in direct
terms, it is clearly the spirit of the Constitution, and it ought
to be so commented and acted on by every friend of free
government.308
The question is whether Congress requiring the Supreme Court to
maintain its official papers for later public inspection would
contradict the separations of powers principles upon which our
government is based. Interestingly, President Nixon made these very
arguments to the Supreme Court when he challenged the
constitutionality of the Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act,309 a law passed prior to the PRA designed to deal
exclusively with the papers of Richard Nixon.310 The law directed the
General Services Administration (GSA) to take custody of over 42
million pages of documents and 880 tape recordings generated by the
Nixon Administration to ensure they would be available for public
inspection.311 President Nixon fought the law making numerous
constitutional challenges including that the law violated the
separation of powers.312 He claimed that Congress could not delegate
to the Administrator of General Services, someone who worked
inside the Executive Branch, the final authority over the papers and
recordings because such a delegation constituted “an impermissible
interference by the Legislative Branch into matters inherently the
business solely of the Executive Branch.”313 Nixon argued that the
law also interfered with presidential privilege.314
The Supreme Court rejected Nixon’s argument for three reasons.
First, the Court observed that President Ford signed the law,
308. 1 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA: A COLLECTION OF THE VIEWS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 194 (John P. Foley ed. 1900).
309. See generally Nixon v. Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
310. Id. at 431.
311. Id. at 430.
312. Id. at 439.
313. Id. at 440.
314. Id. at 339–40.
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President Carter’s Justice Department defended the law in federal
court, and thus there was presidential approval of the law’s
constitutionality.315 Second, the Court said that the separation of
powers was helped, not harmed, by the law’s placement of
responsibility over the president’s papers and recordings in an officer
inside the Executive Branch because “it is clearly less intrusive to
place custody and screening of the materials within the Executive
Branch itself than to have Congress or some outside agency perform
the screening function.”316 Third, the Court said that Nixon’s view of
separation of powers was overly formalistic and rigid to the extent
that he argued that the three branches of government had to be totally
separate from each other in order for each branch to properly fulfill
its assigned duties.317 The more appropriate test, the Court said, was
“whether the Act . . . prevents the Executive Branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.”318 Because the
materials were kept inside the Executive Branch, and because the
president was able to assert numerous privileges to their public
disclosure if he deemed it necessary to the interests of the United
States, the Court rejected Nixon’s claims that the law violated the
separation of powers.319
The Court’s decision in Nixon supports the idea that requiring the
Justices to allow access to their official records would not violate the
separation of powers as long as Congress required the Justices
themselves or the Judicial Office of the United States Courts to play a
prominent role in the maintenance, collection, and eventual display
of the records. As Professor Watts suggests, the appropriate course
would be for Congress to declare, as it did with the president’s
records, that the official files of the Justices are public, not private
property, but then require either the Justices themselves or the
Judicial Office to promulgate rules and regulations governing how
those files are kept, what privileges the justices may assert, and how
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Nixon, 433 U.S. at 441.
Id. at 444.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 444–45.
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long they should be kept secret until the public is allowed access.320
If Congress were to proceed in that manner, the law would not
threaten the separation of powers and would not interfere with the
Court’s constitutionally assigned duties.321
Under current law, Supreme Court justices may destroy their
official files for any and all reasons and may limit access to those
materials to a privileged few for any period of time.322 As noted
earlier, Chief Justice Burger, for example, retired almost thirty years
ago and his records have still not been made public.323 There are
many reasonable ways to go about ensuring the public has reasonable
access to the Justices’ papers, but allowing each justice to make any
and all (or no) rules governing that access makes no sense and greatly
lessens the transparency of our highest Court.
I am not suggesting that each and every paper and e-mail a justice
writes is necessarily a matter of public concern or that these records
should be made available immediately after a justice resigns or dies
in office. There are legitimate concerns involving the confidentiality
of these records such as whether other sitting Justices may be
adversely affected by the disclosure of their communications with the
retired or deceased justice.324 But there should be a legally required
method of insuring the public access to the non-privileged records of
the Justices after a reasonable period of time. In a perfect world, the
Justices themselves would create such a system but there is
absolutely no indication that they are willing to do so. Therefore, as it
did with the president’s papers, Congress should work with the
justices and the administrative arm of the Court and enact a law
allowing the American people to have access to the official records
of the Court generated in the course of the Justices’ taxpayer-paid
official duties.

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of the United States makes decisions which
significantly affect the lives of all Americans. Whether states may
prohibit abortions, whether cities may ban hand-guns, whether
Congress may enact meaningful campaign finance reform, and
whether thousands of colleges and universities may employ
affirmative action, are just a very few of the important issues the
Court has resolved over the last few years.325 How the Justices use
their power of judicial review to alter, lessen, or grant the American
people rights and responsibilities is not likely to change in the
foreseeable future, but we should be able to observe the Court more
clearly and hold it more accountable. It is well past time to shine a
brighter light on the nine most important judges in the United States.
The easiest transparency problem to solve is the Justices’ lack of
visibility while they perform their official and public functions.
Supreme Court oral arguments and decision days, already open to the
public, should be available for the world to see and in real time. For
present day citizenship moments, historical study and pride, and pure
democratic accountability, the Court needs to join the majority of
American states and numerous other countries, such as Canada and
the United Kingdom, and allow television cameras in their
courtroom. Our next generation of lawyers, public servants, and
citizens deserve nothing less. There is no good reason that the video
of dramatic moments in American history, such as Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s announcement in 2015 that millions of gays and lesbians
across the United States have the constitutional right to marry, should
be lost forever.
Supreme Court Justices are the only federal judges in the country
not bound by a code of ethics.326 Each individual Justice has the final
say over whether she will recuse herself over a potential or actual

325. See generally Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
326. Smith, supra note 2.
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conflict of interest.327 The Justices should be bound by the same
ethics and recusal constraints that all other judges must abide by. If
anything, the Justices should be more, not less, transparent than
lower court federal judges.
Every year, lawyers file more than 7,500 petitions for certiorari
and only 70–80 are accepted by the Justices.328 Many of those
requests raise serious legal issues and significant time, energy, and
money are poured into the briefs. Yet, there is no official record of
which Justices voted to hear which cases, and there is no formal way
to understand a Justices’ certiorari votes over time.329 When
historians try to evaluate a Justices’ thirty years on the bench, how
the Justice voted on which cases to hear is vitally important. There is
no legitimate reason why we should be denied this true and relevant
information about important governmental choices.
For many of the reasons discussed in this article, Supreme Court
Justices are far removed from the people they are supposed to serve.
Even after the Justices retire or die, this lack of transparency
continues to an alarming degree.330 To cite just one of many
examples, the official tax-payer funded official records of Chief
Justice Burger, who left the Court in 1986, are still invisible to the
American public, and will remain so for many more years.331 We
have a law declaring that the President’s official records belong to
the public and requiring the National Archives to organize them (take
out all privileged material) and make them available to the people a
reasonable time after a President leaves offices.332 Congress should
work with the Administrative Office of the Supreme Court, and the
Justices themselves, and enact a similar open-records law so that we
have a more accurate understanding of how our Supreme Court
operates over time.

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
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Most importantly, the Supreme Court ought to embrace the same
democratic presumption of openness and transparency that we take
for granted with the other branches of government. Unless national
security, foreign policy sensitive materials, or private personnel
matters are at issue, we expect the elected branches to open their
doors and records to reasonable public inspection. When the elected
branches want to keep records or proceedings secret, they bear the
heavy burden of demonstrating the need for that secrecy. But when it
comes to the Supreme Court, there appears to be an exactly opposite
presumption. Whether it is the lack of cameras, the anonymity of the
certiorari votes, the refusal of the Justices to abide by the same
ethical and recusal rules as other judges, or the lack of any rules
regarding their official papers, the story of the Supreme Court is one
of secrecy and mythology instead of an accountability and
transparency.
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